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THE ACTION OF DEBT -AT
COMMON LAW,
UNDER MODERN CODES, PRACTICE ACTS
AND RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE'
ALISON REPPY
I.

INTRODUCTION-HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

THE Action of Debt is one of the oldest2 and perhaps the
broadest of all the Personal Common-Law Actions. According to
Chitty,' the action lies to recover money, in a sum certain or capable
of being reduced to a certainty, due upon simple contracts, express
or implied, whether verbal or written, upon law or custom. While
the duties which Debt can be used to enforce are diverse, it is nevertheless a very simple remedy. Originally at the foundation of the
action was the primary conception of pure legal duty. And as it never
departed from this conception it has proved to be one of the most inflexible of the Common-Law Remedies.
Two Viewpoints to be Kept in View in Discussing Debt
IN general, it may be said that the Action of Debt is coextensive
with the conception of a debt as developed at Common Law, hence
whatever factual situation could be regarded as creating a debt was
also treated as sufficient to sustain an Action of Debt. Thus, in discussing the origin, history, development, and application of Debt, our
viewpoint will from time to time shift. Sometimes the discussion will
be from the viewpoint of debts regarded as flowing from legal duties,
for which the Action of Debt became a remedy; sometimes it will be
from the viewpoint of Debt conceived as the remedy for the enforcement of such legal duties.
AuIsoN REPPY is Dean and Professor of Law, New York Law School.
1 In general, on the origin, history and development of the Action of Debt, see:
Treatises: 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, C. 9, Debt (1st
ed., Philadelphia 1772) ; PRUYZEAU, A TREATISE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND NOW IN FORCE
FOR THE RECOVERY OF DEBT (London 1791); HOLMES, HISTORY OF CONTRACT, Lecture
VII, 267-270 (Boston 1881); 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISr LAW, c. V.

The Action of Debt, 203-214 (Cambridge 1895); id., c. V., Contract-The Doctrine of

NEW YORK LAW FORUM

[VoL. 4

Social and Economic Background Against Which the Action of Debt
Developed
ACCORDING to Pollock and Maitland, 4 in the Thirteenth Century,
Quid Pro Quo, 210 (Cambridge 1895); MARaN, CIVIL PROCEDURE AT Comi.o LAW,
c. II, Debt, §§ 39-44, 33-42 (St. Paul 1905); 3 STRE, FOUNDATiONS OF LEGALr LIABILITY,
c. XI, Action of Debt, 127-143 (Northport 1906); JEN Ks, SHORT HIsToRY OF ENGLIsHE
LAW, c. V., Debt 54-57 (Boston 1913); AMEs, LECTuRES ON LEGAL HISTORY, c. VIII,
The Action of Debt, 93 (Cambridge 1913); PLUCKNETT, STATUTES AND THEIR INTERPRETATION, Pt. II, c. XI, Exigent and the Writ of Debt, § 6, 133 (Cambridge 1922); SiM'MAN, HANDBOOK Or CoMoN LAW PLEADINo, c. VII, Action of Debt, §§ 92-94, 132-141
(3d ed. by Ballantine, St. Paul 1923); KEIowi, CASES ON CommoN LAW PLEADING, C. II,
Th'e Common Law Actions, Bk. I, The Action of Debt, 33-59 (2d ed. Rochester 1934);
MAITLAND, Tm FoRms OF AcToIN AT CommoN LAW, Lecture V, Debt, 63 (Cambridge
1948); POTTER, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO ENeGLisH LAW, c. V, Debt, 441-443 (3d ed.
London 1948); PLUCKNET, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE Comriox LAW, Bk. II, Pt. 1,
c. I, Debt, 343-345 (4th ed. London 1948); MORGAN, THE STUDY OF LAW, c. I, Debt, 9296 (2d ed. Chicago 1948); FimooT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE Coron

LAW, C. X,

217-233 (London 1949); id., c. XVI, Consideration, 395-412 (London 1949); WALsrr,
A HISTORY OF ANGLo-AMERubAN LAW, c. X]X, Debt, § 176, 238-239 (2d ed. Indianapolis1950).
Articles: Salmond, The History of Contract, 3 L. Q. REV. 166 (1887); Ames, Parol
Contract Prior to Assumpsit, 8 HARv. L. REV. 252 (1895); Holmes, The Common Law,
57 U. oF PA. L. REa. 611 (1909); Holdsworth, Debt, Assumpsit and Consideration, 11
MhcIE. L. REV. 348 (1913); Henry, Considerationin Contracts, 601 A.D. to 1256 A.D., 26
YALE L. J. 664 (1917); Stone, Concerning the Action of Debt at the Time of the Year
Books, 36 L. Q. REV. 61 (1920); Keigwin, The Action of Debt, 11 GEO. L. 3. 20 (1923);
Bailey, Assignments of Debts in England from the Twelfth to the Twentieth Century,
Pt. I, 47 L. Q. REV. 546 (1932); Yatema, The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in
Anglo-American Law, 33 Mcir. L. REV. 1129 (1923); Winfield, Quasi-Contractfor Work
Done, 63 L. Q. REV. 35 (1947).
Comments: Debt: What Constitutes, 16 COL. L. REV. 243 (1916); Sum Certain in
the Action of Debt, 33 YALE L. J. 85 (1923).
Annotations: Necessity in Action on Judgment of Sister State Conferred Under Warrant of Attorney, of Alleging and Proving the Law of the Latter State Permitting Such
Judgment, 155 A. L. R. 921 (1945).
Statutes: The Statute of Wales, 12 Edw. I, 1 Statutes at Large 144 (1284); The
Statute of Merchants, 11 Edw. I, 1 Statutes at Large 141 (1283) ; The Statute of Merchants, 13 Edw. I, 1 Statutes at Large 236 (1285).
In General, on imprisonment for Debt, see:

Treatises: DAWES, COMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ARRESTS IN CIVIL CASES (London
1787); FARLEY, IMPRISONMNT FoR DEBT UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND OPPRESSIVE, PROVED
CONSTITUTION AND THE RIGHTS
PROM = FUNDAENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE BRIsT
OF NATURE (London 1788); CROWTHER, THE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF ARREST IN PER6
SONAL ACTIONS (London 1828); THEOBALD, THE LAW FOR ABOLISHING IMPRISONMENT 1 R
DEBT ON MESNE PROCESS, EXTENDING THE REM.EDIES OF JUDGMENT CREDITORS, AND
AMIENDMENT OF THE LAW RELATING TO INSOLVENT DEBTORS (London 1838).

Articles: Holdsworth, Debt, Assumpsit and Consideration, 11 HAMw. L. REV. 348
(1913); Ford, Imprisonment for Debt, 25 MICe. L. REv. 24 (1926).
Comments: To Gaol for Debt in Wisconsin, 1952 WIs. L. REV. 764.
2 BIGELOW, HISTORY or ENGLISH: PROCEDURE, c. IV, The Writ Process, 160-165
(Boston 1880).
3 1 CHIM,
TREATISE ON PLEADING AND PARTIES TO ACTIONS, WITH PRECEDENTS AND
Fo-ms, c. I1, 108, 109 (16th Am. ed., by Perkins, Springfield 1876).

4 2 HISTORY or ENorsH LAW, c. V, Contract, 201-202 (Cambridge 1895); 1 SELECT
CIVI

PLEAS, 102 (3 S. S. 42).
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in which the early evolution of Debt was in process, a shrewd and
vigilant creditor was under no necessity of bringing an action to recover money which he had lent. This necessity was avoided by the development of "two forms of preferential treatment, ' to wit, the
Recognizance and relief under the Statute of Merchants' in 1283 and
the Statute of Merchants in 1285, 7which
were complementary to each
other. These two devices for securing the interests of creditors will
now be considered.
(I) The Recognizance.-Under this method of preferential treatment the creditor did not rely on the word of his debtor, either oral or
written, but in advance of the loan or coincident therewith, secured
either a Judgment or a Recognizance (recognosset). Under the
Recognizance the debtor recognized or acknowledged that he owed the
creditor a sum of money, promised to pay on a certain day and undertook that if he did not pay, the Sheriff might levy an Execution on
his goods and lands, in actions for which the Sheriff sometimes remitted the Damages supposed to already be due to him from his
debtor. The acknowledgment above was thereupon entered upon the
Court Rolls and, as such, later came to be referred to as a "Contract
of Record." This form of proceeding was in existence as early as the
year 1201.8
Even more frequently the parties went into Chancery or the
Court of Exchequer and made an entry upon the Roll of the Court,
confessing that he owed a debt payable upon a certain day, and
granted that if he made default, the Sheriff might levy for the money.
Pollock and Maitland suggest that this resort to Chancery may have
grown out of the practice of some of its officers acting as money
lenders on a considerable scale 9 Both Types of Recognizance resulted
in the equivalent of a Judgment, leaving nothing to be done but Levy
an Execution on the debtor's goods and lands. Under these devices for
security, within a year of the day fixed for payment, Execution issued
as a matter of course on the creditor's application, unless the debtor
paid his obligations and procured a cancellation or vacation of the
original entry which described his confession.
G FIr00T, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE CO1AiON LAW, C. 10, Debt, 221 (London
1949).
6 11 Edw. I, 1 Statutes at Large 1 (1283).
7 13 Edw. I, 1 Statutes at Large 1 (1285).
8 2 PoLLocK AND MAITLAND, HIsToRY or ENGLISH LAw, 202 (Cambridge 1895), citing as authority, a case decided in 1201, 1 SELECT CiVIL PLEAS, 102 (3 S.S.42).
9 Ibid.
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(II) The Statute of Merchants-Act of Burnell'° (1283) and
the Statute of Merchants" (1285).-This second method of according
security to creditors, which reflected a state policy favorable to merchants, instituted a new and popular Contract of Record, the so-called
"Statute Merchant." Under the authority of these statutes a creditor
was empowered to cause his debtor to come before the Mayor of a
town, as provided by the first statute, or the chief officer of a Fair, as
provided by the second statute, to acknowledge his debt, which acknowledgement was entered in a Roll by the Clerk. The Clerk then
made out a Bill Obligatory (escrit de obligacion) to which the Seal of
the debtor was attached, after which the King's Seal was also attached,
which Seals remained in the keeping of the Mayor and Clerk. Thereafter, if the debtor failed to pay on the day prescribed, he was hailed
before the Mayor and Clerk, who ordered the satisfaction of the debt
out of the debtor's movables; if the debtor had no movables, he then
might be arrested, and, if necessary, his property, both real and personal, might be sold.'
The Alleged Absence of a Common Denominator Unifying the Various
Forms of the Action of Debt
THE leading textbook writers have repeatedly told us that the
Action of Debt lies to recover a sum certain due on a Simple Contract, a Specialty or a Record. But they have not made clear the common denominator which makes the Debt applicable in an Action on
a Judgment or other Record, on a Statute, on a Simple Contract or
on a Specialty."3 We are told by these authorities that Debt lies for a
sum certain, only to discover later, as Professor Charles A. Keigwin
said, "that on Some Contracts the action does not lie, that in some
situations it does lie though there be no Contract and again that money
may be recovered in this Form of Action although the amount due is
1o 11 Edw. I, 1 Statutes at Large

1 (1283).
11 13 Edw. I, 1 Statutes at Large 1 (1285).

'2 See the following cases: Y. B. 21 Edw. I. (R. S.) 76 (1293); Y. B. 12 & 13 Edw.
HI. (R. S.) 130 (1338); Lacy's Case, Y. B. 16 Edw. III. (R. S.) 146 (1342).
13 Professor Charles A. Keigwin has observed that what is common among the
various forms of Debt "is not superficially obvious; nor has any text writer, so far as I
know, undertaken to point it out." See article, The Action of Debt, 11 GEo. L. J. 21
(1923). He admits, however, that PROFESSOR R. Ross PERRY, in his work, ComI.XoN

LAW PLEADING: ITS HISTORY AND PRINCIPLES (Boston 1897), and DEAN ALEXANDER
MARTIN, in his text on Civir PROCEDURE AT CommON LAW (St. Paul 1905), have afforded

"some information concerning the nature and development of the action," but insists
that both "seem to me provokingly allusive; and it is doubtful whether any student
could attain a satisfactory understanding of the subject from the unsupplemented text
of either." Supra, note 2.
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not fixed beforehand and not made certain until it is assessed by a
Jury."'14 He points out that Blackstone's definition of a debt was not
sufficiently inclusive and that Judge Story was never able to understand why Debt was not available against a surety, 5 while Lord
Loughborough, in Rudder v. Price,6 could see no satisfactory reason
why a sum payable in installments could not be recovered in Debt as
such installments accrued.
The confusion in thought described above and the failure of the
text-writers to find a common denominator between the Various Forms
of Debt may be attributed to the fact that both the writers and Judges
relied mainly upon conventional formulas handed down, which formulas revealed no consistency or logical connection. The key to these
seeming anomalies was to be discovered in long forgotten history,
which, in the last fifty years, has been dug up, clarified, and made
generally available to the legal profession by such distinguished English and American legal scholars as Ames, Bigelow, Pollock, Pound,
Maitland, and a host of others. As a result of their studies, which
have been placed within the reach of the student in the form of books
or law review articles, the Action of Debt has assumed its rightful
status "as a juridical institution which is entirely intelligible in its
origin and nature, expanding by a perfectly natural, if not inevitable,
development, thoroughly logical in its divers applications, and essentially consistent in its superficial anomalies." 17 Such a view of Debt
explains Detinue, dispels the mystery which has enshrouded the Nature
and Scope of General (Indebitatus) Assumpsit, and prepares the way
for a consideration of those limitations on Debt, which had their
origin in the early formulation of legal principles by the Ancient
Courts, when what we now call the Common-Law System was being
superimposed upon the many Local Jurisdictions, in favor of a Centralized Court and a National Law.
Jurisdiction Exercised by the Local Courts over Debt in the Early
Stages of Its Development
IN the developmental stage of the Action of Debt, the enforcement of debts was largely confined to the jurisdiction of the Local
14
15
(U. S.)
debt.
16
17

Keigwin, The Action of Debt, 11 Gpo. L. J. 20 (1923).
Bullard v. Bell, 1 Mason (U. S.) 243 (1816). In Raborg v. Peyton, 2 Wheaton
385 (1817). Judge Story displayed the same uncertainty as to the nature of a
1 H. B1. 550, 126 Eng. Rep. 314 (1791).
See article by Keigwin, The Action of Debt, 11 GEO. L. J. 20, 22 (1923).
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Courts. In the Thirteenth Century, however, with the social and
economic development of the country and with the influx of foreign
capital, the Royal Courts gradually assumed jurisdiction over suits
for debts. By the time of Edward I (1272-1307), according to Pollock
and Maitland, 8 the action was available to recover money lent, the
price of goods sold, arrears of rent due upon a lease for years, or a
debt confessed to be due by a sealed instrument. But if there existed
a legal duty to pay a specific amount of chattels or money, Debt was
generally available as a remedy, whether such duty arose from Simple
Contract, Grant by a Specialty, or under a Covenant.
The Action of Debt, as thus developed in the early Common Law,
was both a Personal and a Transitory Action, except in the case of
rent reserved for life, or in fee or charged in fee, or in fee tail. In such
cases the plaintiff had to resort to a Real Action, which was Local in
character. Debt, in this respect, resembled Account and Covenant. It
followed, therefore, that if A brought an original writ in X County, he
might declare in Y County, as every legal duty was a duty in every
County, under the rule of debitum et contractus suut nullius loci.10
This rule of the Common Law was changed in the year 1382 by the
Statute of Richard 11,20 which provided that in Debt and certain other
enumerated actions the Declaration should allege that the Contract
was executed in the County where the action was begun, which, in
effect and to some extent destroyed the transitory character of the
duty to pay a debt. In time, however, this provision was evaded. Originally, the failure to bring suit in the County where the obligation
arose, was raised by a Plea in Abatement, or upon a Motion. Gradually, however, this practice fell into disuse, the Courts holding that
where the Obligation or Specialty was dated at large, or stated no
specific place of performance, it could be sued upon in any County.
Finally, in the case of Stalmer v. Slingsby,21 the road for circumvention of the original Statutory Rule was opened up, by a holding that the
only effect of the Statute was to require the Declaration to follow the
Original Writ and that the statement of a Fictitious Venue in a Tranof
sitory Action, which Venue was set forth solely for the purpose
22
grounding the Court's Jurisdiction, could not be Traversed.
18 2 HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, c.

V, Contract, 210

(Cambridge 1895).

19 This rule did not apply to Debt in a Manorial Court; their jurisdiction extended
only to debts arising within the manor. 3 STREET, FOUNDATiONS OF LEoAL LT mnTY,
c. XI, The Action of Debt, 136 (Northport 1906).
20 c. 2, 2 Statutes at Large 253.
21 Aleyn 17, 82 Eng. Rep. 891 (1670).
22 Thus, in the case of Dutch West Indies Co. v. Van Moses, 1 Stra. 612, 93 Eng.
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The Action of Debt-Detinue a Real Action
As early as the year 1189, while the Common Law was still in a
plastic stage, the Action known as Debt was in existence. It was as
yet but a component part of what Maitland referred to as DebtDetinue, the earliest of the Personal Actions. Because it was a Personal Action, it is highly important to observe that it had its origin in
and developed out of an Early Form of one of the Ancient Real
Actions, that is, out of one of the Writs of Right.
(I) Debt as Seen by Glanvill.-Glanvill, who was the first to
discuss this action with a dual character, and who borrowed his language from the Civil Law, observed that a debt might be grounded
on any one of a number of causes,23 the most significant of which were
commodatum and mutuum, for as Fifoot says, "while these are the
words of Rome, the law is the law of England." 24 From a modern
viewpoint, Glanvill's treatment of the subject we now call Contract,
and which in a certain sense was not then even in existence, was very
abbreviated, a fact which he justified by observing that "private agree25
ments are not usually protected in the Court of our Lord the King."
But, as we have earlier seen, Glanvill, the Courts and the Judges, were
primarily interested in securing the loan as opposed to the loan itself,
hence the debtor was required to execute some form of security. He
might make a deed, offer sureties, pledge his faith, or his goods and
chattels, as security for the repayment of the debt. A breach of faith
was heard in the Ecclesiastical Courts,2 6 whereas a breach of corporeal
interests invoked the jurisdiction of the Common-Law Courts, if a
Recognizance or other form of security had been Enrolled upon their
Records.
However this may be, the important thing to remember is to recall the Real Actions from the catholicity of oblivion for the purpose
of observing that they had two outstanding characteristics, that is,
27
they were complicated, expensive, dilatory, and highly technical;
Rep. 733 (1725), in an action for money borrowed in Amsterdam and payable there, the
debtor was sued in London, and the plaintiff alleged that the debt originated "at Amsterdam in Holland,. to wit, at Cheapside in the parish of St. Mary in London," it was
held that the Allegation was good and that the Venue could not be Traversed.
23 Fifoot listed the causes as: "excausa mutui aut ex causa venditionis aut ex commodato aut ex locato cut ex deposito aux alia just debendi causa." HISTORY Am
SouRcEs or =rmCommox LAw, c. 10, Debt, 217 (London 1949).
24 Id. at 218.
25 GLAwVmL, TRACTATUS DE LEGIBUS ET cONsUETUDINIBUS

REGNI ANGLIE,

c. 18 (London 1569).
26 BARBOuR, HISTORY or CONTRACT iN EARLY ENGLISH EQUITY
27

Book X,

(London 1914).

For the rise and decline of the Real Actions, and a statement as to their influ-
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and they, the Real Actions, sought the recovery of a specific thing or
res, their characteristics being suggested by the name "Real," just as in
the Civil Law a Real Statute differs from a Personal Statute in that the
former relates to a specific thing while the latter applies to a person.
Using the nomenclature of the Roman Law, the Common Law ultimately classified Actions as Real, Mixed and Personal, the Real
Actions referring to those in which some specific res or thing, such as
a parcel of land, was restored to its rightful owner. In consequence
such interests in land were called real property, as they were recoverable in Real Actions, whereas property recoverable in Personal Actions
was referred to as personal property. The principal and fundamental
characteristic of a Real Action, therefore, was that it enabled a plaintiff to recover a specific piece of property, a res, capable, in the plaintiff's mind, of identification and segregation, under a particular description-eo nomine et in numero (by name and in number).
The dual-faced form of the Action of Debt-Detinue, which thus
originated as a Real Action, gradually evolved into a Personal Action.
The res or property sought to be recovered was the demandant's or
to use the language of the evolving Personal Action, the plaintiff had
title. Title was demanded, not because the defendant had promised
to deliver and not on the ground of the plaintiff's disseisin, or the detention of the plaintiff's property. The plaintiff's right to recover was
based on his ownership of the specific property in issue; he was entitled
to the property, not because of the commission of a tort or the breach
of a contract, but because the defendant was withholding something
which the plaintiff, in point of law, was entitled to have.
It follows logically, therefore, that since the Action of Debt was
a Form of a Real Action, we might expect to find that it, as the heir
of a Real Ancestor, had inherited the two limiting characteristics of
the parent, that is, one, that Debt lies only to recover a specific res,
possessing a certain identity, susceptible of description and limitation,
and, two, not merely something within a general class of things; and
that Debt, like that form of the Writ of Right, from which it descended, is based upon the plaintiff's right of ownership, distinct from
and entirely independent of any Breach of Contract or any tortious
conduct on the part of the disseisor.
This relationship between the Original Writ of Right and the
ence on the development of the law in general, see Chapter V, The Development of the
Forms of Action.
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Original Writ of Debt has been clearly established by the research
of modern scholars; the evidence is compelling, if not overwhelming.
(A) The First Writ of Debt Modelled Upon the Writ of Right.
-If we set forth the Forms of the Original Writ of Right and the
Original Writ of Debt, as they were embalmed for many years prior
to the publication of Glanvill's famous treatise on the Common Law,28
we may see at a glance their close affinity. Glanvill, who, so far as
we know, was the first to attempt an explanation of this action with a
dual character, gave us Two Forms, which will be printed side by
side for comparative purposes, as follows:
FoRms OF AN

ORIGINAL WRIT OF RIGHT AND AN

ORIGINAL WRIT OF DEBT

DEBT

RIGHT
HENRY I,

The King to the

Sheriff.
BID A that he justly and
without delay render (praecipe
quod reddat) to B one hide of
land in such a vill, of which the
said B complains that the said "A
unjustly deforceth him. And
unless he does it, summon him,'
&c.
(GLANVILL,

lib. I, cap. 6)

HENRY

I, The King to the

Sheriff.
Bm N that he justly and
without delay render (praecipe
quod reddat) to R 100 marks
which he owes him, as he (R)
saith, and of which he (R) complains that he (N) unjustly deforceth him, &c. And unless he
does it, summon him,' &c.
(GLANVILL, lib. X, cap. 2)

In discussing the Original Writ of Debt, which, as we see by
glancing above, was clearly a modified copy of the Original Writ of
Right known as a praecipe in capita (Writ of Right), Glanvill, borrowing from the Roman law, observed that Debt might be based on a
number of causes, the most significant of which were commodatum and
mutuum.2 9 If we observe the Writ of Debt set out above, it will be
seen that under its terms the Sheriff is to bid that the debtor without
delay render a hundred marks which he owes to the plaintiff, of which
the plaintiff complains that the defendant "deforceth him," if the defendant fails to respond to this Order, he is to be summoned before the
King's court. A further glance above at both Forms of Original Writs
will reveal that the plaintiff creditor is being "deforced" of his money in
the Writ of Debt in just the same manner as the defendant owner who
28 TRACTATUS DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS

REGNI ANOLIE, Book I, c. 6 (Trans.

by John Beames, Washington, D. C. 1900).
29 HISTORY AxD SouRcEs OF THE COMMON LAW, c. 10, Debt, 218 (London 1949).
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sues out a Writ of Right is being "unjustly deforced" of his land. In
both cases, the demandant, in the Real Action, and the plaintiff, in the
Personal Action, may be subjected to Trial by Battle, and, as Pollock
and Maitland declare: "The bold crudity of archaic thought equates
the repayment of an equivalent sum of money to the specific restitution of lands or goods."30 Continuing, they point out that our ancestors could not understand credit in any other form; they were merely
asking for what they felt they owned, much as people of today refer
to "my money in the bank," not realizing that all they have is a mere
chose in action which will enable them to recover from the bank if
there is a failure to pay. Slurred over, according to Pollock and Maitland, was the gulf "between mutuum and commodaturm."I' And, in
view of the foregoing, if we would understand Debt, we must get firmly
in mind that by reason of its ancestry it was proprietary in character,
and at the same time observe that as yet there was no proprietary
32
remedy for the recovery of a chattel.
To summarize, therefore, in the language of Professor Charles E.
Keigwin, "It is evident that someone has taken a Writ of Right and
adapted it to a Demand for Money instead of for land, following the
language of the original mutatis mutandis [with the necessary
changes], and conceiving that a plaintiff's title to a specific piece of
land was not essentially different from a creditor's right to a particular
parcel of money, each being wrongfully denied to, or forcibly detained
from its lawful owner. '3' And, if we compare the two Writs set forth
above, with the Modern Writ of Debt, which remained in effect until
Original Writs were finally abolished in 1833, we will find that they
differed only in that in the Writ of Debt the word "detains" was substituted in lieu of the word "deforces" as it appeared in the Writ of
Right, a change in phraseology reflecting the distinction between a
30 2 H.ISTORY OF ENGILISH: LAW, C. V, Contract, 203 (Cambridge 1895).
31 Ibid.
32 Replevin resembled a Real Action on the surface, as the principal characteristic

of the action was the immediate recovery of the plaintiff's chattel. In theory, however,
the action was to recover Damages for the wrongful taking, with the recovery of the
chattel merely incidental, somewhat like Ejectment, which fundamentally was an Action of Trespass, the object of which was to recover Damages, with the recovery of
possession being added as an incident, in order to prevent Equity from assuming jurisdiction to restore the plaintiff to possession. Thus, in Pearson v. Roberts, Willes, 668,
125 Eng. Rep. 1376 (1755), it was properly held that Replevin might be brought for
the recovery of Damages only, without seeking a recovery of possession. And Replevin
might even be maintained against a distrainor who had previously surrendered the chattel
wrongfully taken.
33 See article, The Action of Debt, 11 GEo. L. J. 20, 25 (1923).
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body of land and a mass of money. But this development came shortly
after Glanvill's day.'
(B) The TransitionalStage-Detnue Splits Off from the Main
Trunk of the Tree of Debt and Ceases to be a Compound Part of DebtDetinue.-Between the Writ of Right as a Real Action and the Writ
of Debt as a Personal Action, it seems likely that there was a transitional period during which the developing action was applicable only
to the recovery of corporeal chattels, with the extension to money
demands coming later. When this occurred in the early part of the
Fourteenth Century, the Action of Debt took on a dual aspect; one
Form of the Action lay for the recovery of a Specific Chattel, the other
for the recovery of a Specific Amount of Ponderable Chattels.
(C) Distinction Between Debt in the Debet and Detinet and
Debt in the Detinet. 3 5-- The close relation 36 of Debt and Detinue and
the manner in which Debt split up may best be seen if we look at two
hypothetical cases. Thus, if A bailed his horse, Damascus, to B for
thirty days, and also loaned B five hundred dollars, to be repaid in
thirty days, at the end of the allotted period, if B, upcn demand, refused to deliver up the horse or to repay the money, Debt was available in either case. But by now, when Debt was falling apart, lawyers
were beginning to feel that in certain cases the word "debet" ought
to be used and in others not; that the two forms of loan, the com34 Although Glanvill gave us a Writ of Debt, and although the action occasionally
appeared in the King's Court, for most part the enforcement of debts was largely a
matter for the Local Courts. The Royal Writ of Debt, whether it took the Form of a
Praecipe, which brought the case to the Royal Court, or the Form of a Justices, which
committed it to the Sheriff, seems to have been seldom used, being a luxury which was
sold by the King at a high price. In Henry III's reign (1216-1272), the price ranged
from a quarter of a third of the amount recovered by the plaintiff. But by the end of
Henry's reign, the number of actions was increasing. 2 PoLocK AN MATLmAD, HISTORY
OF ExGLISH LAW, c. V, § 205, 206 (Cambridge 1895).
35 In 3 REEves, HISTORY oF ExorasH LAW, c. XII, 47 (ed. by Finlason, Philadelphia 1882), the distinction between Debt and Detinue had become dear. Reeves refers
to a case decided in the year 1313, in which the Declaration contained Two Counts: in
one Court the plaintiff sued for a sum of money which he said the defendant debet et
detinet, whereas the other was for a sack of wool, which it was said the defendant
detinet.
36 HISTORY AND SOURCES or = Commox LAW, c. 10, Debt, 217 (London 1949).
For a succinct and fuller statement of the same idea, see article by Keigwin, The
Action of Debt, 11 GEo. L. J. 20, 26 (1923), in which he declared: "The distinction
between these kinds of property began to express itself in the Writs about the beginning
of the 1300's; and soon thereafter this action which, because of its dual application,
Maitland calls Debt-Detinue, developed into two: Debt for pecuniary demands and
for bodies of goods which the holder was obligated, debuit, to deliver en bloc, both
being conceived as specific entities, res, due to the plaintiff; and Detinue which lay
for a chattel or several chattels wherein the plaintiff had a previously vested title, a
jus in re."
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modatum and the mutuum, were not one, and that the Judgment in the
Action might give the defendant a choice between restoring the chattel
to the bailor or paying an equivalent in money. If, therefore, we return to our two hypothetical cases, we may observe that in the first
case, A could recover the specific thing or res, Damascus, whereas, in
the second case, A could not recover the specific five hundred dollars,
but only an equivalent amount. The reason for this was that in the
case of Damascus, only possession and not title passed to the bailee,
whereas, in the case of the money, because of its negotiable character,
and because of difficulties of identification, both possession and title
passed to the bailee. With the development of this distinction, the
stage was set for a final separation. In consequence, that Form of
the Action which lay for the recovery of a Specific Chattel, such as
Damascus, the horse,-known as Debt in the Detinet-split off from
the main Trunk of the Tree of Debt, and caused it to be called the
Action of Detinue, whereas that Form of the Action which lay to recover Ponderable and Measurable Chattels, such as money,-known as
Debt in the Debet et Detinet-developed into the modern Action of
Debt. 7 Or, as Fifoot suggests, "The distinction was sometimes explained by saying that, to justify Detinue, he [the plaintiff] must
already enjoy a 'property' in the goods claimed-a rationalization of
some importance in the history of Sale."38
The formula of Debt in the debet et detinet was to be used when
the original creditor sued the original debtor. Where, however, there
had been a death on one side or the other, the word "debet" was not
in order; the representative of the creditor could only allege that the
debtor was unjustly detaining the money, whereas the representative
of the debtor could only be charged with an unjust detention. 0
Finally, while it was possible to bring Debt without the use of the
word "debet," the word was never used outside of the action.
(D) Joinder in the Same Declaration of Counts for Chattels and
Money.-In view of the distinction between Debt in the detinetfor the recovery of Specific Chattels-and Debt in the debet et detinet
-for the recovery of money debts or for the recovery of a debt in the
37 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, c. IV, § 7, 172 (Cambridge 1895). For an Action against a representative, see Y. B. 21 & 22 Edw. I, 615
(R.S.) (1294); an action by a representative, Y. B. 30 &31 Edw. I, 391 (R. S.) (1303);
and an Action between heirs, Clare's Case, Y. B. 12 & 13 Edw. III, 168 (R. S.) (1339),
in which case the plaintiff alleged that the debtor both owed and detained.
3s FirooT, IISTORY AND SOURCFS OF TEE COmmON LAW, c. 10, Debt, 217 (London,
1949).

39 Ibid.
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form of a Specific Amount of Measurable or Ponderable Chattels-it
was to be expected that the precedents in pleading would reveal instances in which a plaintiff, in his Declaration, would join two Counts,
one for money due and owing and the other for chattels unlawfully
detained.4' However, it should be kept clearly in mind that there was
a significant distinction between the Two Forms of Debt. When used
as a remedy to recover a Money Debt, it is regarded as a Personal
Action; when used to enforce a Chattel Debt, the action partook of the
nature of a Property Action. 4 But the Judgment for recovery in both
Forms of Debt was a Money Judgment. And even where the suit was
for a Chattel, the Judgment was always a Money Judgment for the
value of the Chattels, and not a Judgment calling for the delivery of
the Specific Chattel or Chattels. Thus, in Cheney's Case,42 where rentcorn was reserved upon a lease for years and the rent fell in arrears for
two or three years, it was held that the lessor could maintain Debt for
the corn and that his Declaration of so much corn should be in the
detinet, but the Judgment was not to be for corn, but so much money
as the corn was worth.
In modern times, of course, the Money Debt has become the most
important form of the Simple Contract Debt. It should be remembered,
however, that in point of legal theory there has been no severance
between the Two Forms of Debt on Simple Contract, that is, between
the Money and the Chattel Debt. Under the early law the primitive
mind assimilated both forms to each other. Whether what was owed
was money or chattels, the defendant was regarded as withholding
plaintiff. And this is still
property which belonged to the creditor or
43
largely the popular conception of a Debt.
40 Registrum Brevium Orig. 39,-a Writ of Debt for money and chattels.
41 "The earliest fact respecting it the Action of Debt which need here be noticed
is its division into the two Actions of Debt and Detinue. Save for obscure hints in
Bracton [99, 100] and Fleta (ii, 56] there seems to be no reference to this division in the
early legal writers, on the distinction between money and chattels, but apparently on
that between obligation and property. Detinue was an action for the recovery of money
or chattels of which the plaintiff had the ownership; Debt for the recovery of money
or chattels over which the plaintiff's right was merely in personam. This division had
important effects upon the Law of Contract, for it is evident that all bailments would
be relegated to the Action- of Detinue." Salmond, The History of Contract, 3 L. Q.
Rav. 166, 167 (1887).
42 3 Leo. 260, 74 Eng. Rep. 672 (1590).
43 In referring to this conception, in 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH1
LAW, c. V, Contract, 205 (2d ed. Cambridge 1895), it was said: "To all appearances our
ancestors could not conceive credit under any other form. After all, we may doubt
whether the majority of well-to-do people, even at this day, realize that what a man
calls 'my money in the bank' is a merely personal obligation of the banker to him."
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(II) Debt as Seen by Bracton.-It seems that Bracton, in his
famous Treatise on the Common Law, 44 added very little to Glanvill's
treatment of Debt. Like his predecessor Glanvill used Roman" terminology in setting forth the existing English law. He borrowed to some
extent from the Institutes, but principally he relied on the works of
that distinguished scholar, Azo of Bologna. Maine, in his Ancient
Law, 46 felt that Bracton had attempted to "put off on his countrymen"
a treatise, a third of which was borrowed from the Corpus Juris. But
Maitland, taking exception to this criticism, estimated that Bracton
had borrowed less than a thirtieth part of his work from Corpus Juris,
and Kantorowicz 4 7 supported Maitland's position. But Maitland appraised Bracton's scholarship as running a poor second to that of
Azo's. Such an estimate, however, has not been approved by modern
scholars, among whom may be listed Holdsworth, Kantorowicz, Vinogradoff and Woodbine. They feel that Bracton clearly understood the
distinction between the Civil Law and the Common Law, and, as Professor Fifoot observes, "where he tampered with the former it was to
adapt it to the exigencies of the latter. If he drew the outline of English law after a Roman pattern, it was because none other was available, and, if his attempt failed, the fault was not in himself but in
his time."48
(A) The Six Causes Borrowed from the Roman Law.-Agreeing
with Glanvill that the Common Law had no interest in private agreement, Bracton took the view that to be actionable, such agreement
must come within the scope of one of the six causes,4" as borrowed
from the Roman law, the first four of which were the regular catego44 "The great ornament of this reign [Henry III, 1216-1272], is the treatise of
Henry Bracton, De Legibus Consuetudinibus Angllae [London 1569), which has been
so often quoted. Bracton's book, compared with that of Glanvill's, is a voluminous
work. The latter is little more than a sketch, as far as the plan of it goes, and that
is confined to proceedings in the King's court; but the former is a finished and syste-

matic performance, giving a complete view of the law, in all its titles, as it stood at
the time it was written. It is divided into five books, and these into tracts and chapters."
2 REEvEs, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, c. VIII, 357 (Ed. by Finlason, Philadelphia 1880).
45 In general, on the Roman Law in English Law, see Woodbine, The Roman Elements in Bracton's De Adquirendo Revum Dominio, 31 YALE L. J. 827 (1922); Plucknett,
The Relations Between Roman Law and English Common Law, 3 U. OF TORONTO L. J.
38-40 (1937); ViNOGRADO E, THE ROMAN ELEMENTS IN BRACTON'S TREATISE, 1 COLLECTED
PAPERS, 237 (Oxford 1928); KANTOROWICZ, BRACTONI' PROBLEMS, 58-79 (Glasgow 1941).
48 C. IV, 87 (4th Am. ed., New York [n. d.]).
47 See his criticism of PROFESSOR WOODBINE'S BRACTON IN BRACTONIAN PROr3LEMS
(New Haven 1915).
48 HrstoRY AND SOURCES OF T
COMMON LAW, c. 10, Debt, 219 (London 1949).
49 Ibid.
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ries of Roman Contract. Professor Fifoot gives three examples to illustrate the process.5" First,referring to the Obligation Per Scripturum,
he adopted, in general, the text of Justinian's De Litterarum Obligatione, but took the view, contrary to the text, that the writing was
binding in itself, and not merely of evidentiary value. Second, his
"Verbal Obligations" was redeemed by its content, the "judicial" stipulation being identified with the Recognizance, according to Professor
Fifoot.5 1 Third, his comments on "Consensual Obligations" did little
more than "rehearse the Roman names. 52 The "Sale" was extensively
considered, but as a device for transferring ownership, and not as a
Contract.
(B) Debts Arising from Sale.-It must not, however, be assumed
that Bracton was the first to deal with the sale. While the common
origin of an Action of Debt was a loan, the action was soon used to
recover the price of goods. Pollock and Maitland say that "The Contract of Sale as presented by Glanvill is thoroughly Germanic.""
Roman phraseology as used was subsequently qualified. A Sale, to be
binding, required either a delivery of the thing sold, payment of the
price in whole or in part, or the giving of earnest, 54-- conditions which,
in the Seventeenth Century, produced the Statute of Frauds.5 5
Earnest, quite different from payment, was given for the seller's
forbearance to sell or deliver a thing to someone else. And thus the
distinction in the Statute of Frauds between "something in earnest to
bind the bargain" and "part payment." There was some doubt as to
the binding effect of giving "earnest," but Bracton held to the rule
that the defaulting seller was required to pay double the earnest. 56
By his Carta Mercatoria, Edward I (1272-1307) proclaimed that
among merchants "God's penny," by way of earnest, bound the Contract of Sale so that neither party could withdraw from it. And this
50 Ibid.
51 Id.at 220.
52

Ibid.

2 HISTORY OF ENGLIsHr LAw, C. V, Contract, 205 (Cambridge 1895), citing Glanvill, X, 14, and observing that Bracton "worked into his book almost the whole of
Glanvill's text." Note 3.
54 Glanvill, lib. X, 14.
55 29 Car. I, c. 3, 17 (1676), which provided: "Except the buyer shall accept part
of the goods so sold and actually receive the same, or give something in earnest to bind
the bargain, or in part payment, or that some note or memorandum in writing of the
said bargain be made" etc. These words appear almost unchanged in Sec. 4 of our new
Sale of Goods Act, 56 & 57 Vic. c. 71. 2 Polrocx AND MAITLAND, Bk. II, c. V, Contract,
206 (Cambridge 1895).
G6 Bracton, De Legibus & consuetudinibus Angliae, f. 61b, 62 (London 1569).
53
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new rule of the Law Merchant ultimately was adopted by the Common
Law.

57

Where, however, a third party claimed the object as stolen from
him, the seller was required to warrant the buyer's right. On refusal
to do so, he was subject to be impleaded by the buyer, and in either
case the Mode of Trial was by Battle. 5 The old rules as to Vouchers
of Warrantors remained, and it was still true that purchased goods
did not pass to the buyer until delivered, unless the agreement was to
the contrary. And the time, where the owner of goods who was not
the possessor of them was to acquire legal remedies against thieves
and trespassers, was still in the future.
By the middle of the Fifteenth Century, however, it had become
accepted law that the seller could sue in Debt for the price and the
buyer could sue in Detinue for the goods, as if on an executory agreement. 9 This result was justified on the theory that the property might
pass without delivery. But in Doiges Case,6 ° decided in 1442, it was
held that the same rule was not to be applied to a sale of land, as such
a transfer required livery of seisin, whereas, in the case of a chattel,
the property passed by reason of the agreement. It is not surprising
therefore to note that in the Anonymous Case of 1458,1 Chief Justice
Prisot took the view that the sale of a chattel constituted a clear exception to the usual requirement of a quid pro quo in Debt.
As of this period the Common Law had not developed "the Executory Contract,"-a Form of Contract which will therefore come in for
later discussion.
(C) Other Forms of Debt.-The Action of Debt, in many ways,
appears to be associated with Contract, but if we look closely at the
Scope of the Action, the difficulty of expressing the variety of transactions covered by Debt through "a common consensual denominator"6 2 becomes clear. A large proportion of the claims found in the
reports from 1278 to 1376 involved Sealed Instruments, the most interesting among which were the Scripta Obligatoria,13 under which a
Contract, 207 (Cam1895).
Glanvill, lib. X, _15.
FnFoor, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW, c. 10, Debt, 228 (London

57 2 PoLxocK AND MAiTLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, C. V,

bridge
58
59
1949).
60
61

Y. B. 20 Hen. VI, 34, pl. 4.
Y. B. 37 Hen. VI, f. 8, pl. 18 (1458).

62 FiFooT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMION LAW, c. 10, Debt, 220 (London

1949).
63 Ibid.
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debtor might undertake to pay his creditor or some one designated by
him. By the time of Edward I (1272-1307) the King's Courts had
recognized that Debt would lie on these Scripta Obligatoria,and they
not infrequently were the subject of litigation in the Local Courts.
Such instruments were in the nature of assignments of choses in
action and were not negotiable.
The Debt as Constituting a Res
IN the early Common Law an action to recover a Specific Tract
of Realty was called a Real Action, and the primitive mind had no
difficulty in dealing with the concept. And it required no great wrench
in their thinking to visualize a Corporeal Chattel, such as a horse, in
the same way. But to bridge the gap between a concrete object, such
as a piece of land to a sum of money, as having concreteness and
identity was something different. To assimilate money one has lent,
and which must be repaid, to the land or to the horse; to conceive of
the right to an undetermined number of dollars as a title to an identical body of money, recoverable as a single thing and in solido, required
an imagination which even stretches the capacity of the modern mind.
There was, of course, no difficulty about the single chattel. By the
substitution of a few descriptive words, it was easy to convert a Writ
of Right for land into a Writ of Right for a boat or a horse. And, if
a man was entitled to recover land which he had never occupied, by
reason of a title devolving upon him, it was also conceivable that a
man might have right to a chattel, or to chattels, which he never before possessed, if he could show that by some means, as for example,
by Operation of Law, the title has been transferred to him. Thus, to
illustrate, and to use one of Professor Keigwin's hypothetical cases, if a
statute prohibits unlawful fishing or hunting and provides for forfeiture
of any article, such as a boat or gun, to any one who shall inform of
the violation of the law and sue for the forfeited chattel, it may be
said that the effect of the offence was to transfer the title from the
original owner to the informer, who may now sue as if he were the
owner, and his suit would be in the nature of a Real Action for a
specific res, demanded in the Declaration as the property of the plaintiff, and a thing which the defendant ought to deliver to the complainant, because under the statute, by Operation of Law, the title has
passed. Moreover, a number of articles may be thought of collectively
or conceived of in the aggregate as an individual entity, composed of,
64

Id. at 221.
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but itself distinct from the individual article which makes up the
whole. Thus, when a man buys a flock of forty sheep, or a farm of
five hundred acres, he thinks of his act as the purchase of a flock and
not forty single sheep, of a farm and not five hundred single acres.
Therefore, if we apply our forfeiture statute to this situation, the
thing forfeited would be the flock as an entirety, not forty single sheep.
Or, when a cargo of a vessel is forfeited for smuggling, the entire body
of goods is regarded as a single thing, as an entity having an identity
of its own, distinct from the many articles which go to make up the
cargo. The Action for recovery in such a case is in effect a Real
Action to recover a res by one who sues by virtue of his ownership
against a wrongdoer who ought to deliver it, because, by Operation of
Law, he is legally bound to do so. In these cases it requires no more
than a mere change in language to speak of the property involved as
a debt, as it is by reason of the forfeiture due to the plaintiff. And if
by Operation of Law, or by any transaction, one owning goods shall
lose his right in them, and become obligated to convey the possession
to a new owner, the situation would be quite like a forfeiture. In the
Mediaeval Mind when Debt was passing through its early stages of
development, there were several other devices which effected the same
legal end; situations in which a legal duty was created whereby one
owed and therefore ought to deliver to another something or somethings, which might conceivably be money.
Such an obligation might be created by a Statute, imposed by a
Judgment declaring a duty to pay, evidenced by a Sealed Instrument
acknowledging an Obligation, or by a Contract transferring Title from
the Defendant to the Plaintiff. By reason of the foregoing, we may
say that the Action of Debt lay, and still lies, for the recovery of a
chattel, conceived as an integral whole-a res-which the possessor
is bound by legal duty, or by Operation of Law to deliver and pay over
to the plaintiff. The transition in ancient thought from Land to Corporeal Chattels and from Corporeal Chattels to Pecuniary Debts was
simplified by the fact that the only money of that day was a rude,
heavy coin, a thing as corporeal as cattle. And the thing the plaintiff had in mind in suing in. Debt was not an indefinite sum of money,
but a concrete bag of metal coins, as physical a concept as a bull or a
flock of sheep. Even today, money is still a chattel; we speak of
money in the bank; the bank owes us a chose in action, not the currency in the bag. And this difference between money and other goods
was much less clear to the Mediaeval Mind than to ours. If we recur
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to our case of forfeiture, we may conceive of a number of -coins in
the offender's purse, which by his unlawful act are transferred from
his ownership to that of the informer. The sum due is idealized as a
definite concrete thing, or res, which is as individual and susceptible
of identification as any specific chattel. It may be and was assimilated
to a Specific Corporeal Chattel; and we may say the offender has lost
his title to the money named in the Statute and that the beneficiary
of the Statute-the informer or other designated person-is entitled
to recover it as his own money, and the wrongdoer is bound in Law
to deliver it over to the person entitled under the Statute. Thus, by
some such process of reasoning, our ancestors converted the conception of a money debt into the conception of an objective fact, as concrete in their minds as the bag of coins by which it was to be paid, and
yet distinct from money in general-a concrete integral thing which
may be demanded by specific description eo nomine and recovered in
right of ownership by a Real Action just as might be recovered, by
like action-a steer or a flock of sheep which was justly due to the
plaintiff.
And, as Professor Keigwin, so aptly observes: "By such course of
progressive adaptation, we may confidently surmise, from the Writ of
Right for the Recovery of Land was evolved a Writ of Right for the
Recovery of a Chattel, then for a Body of Chattels integrated as a
single res, and thence the Writ of Right for a sum of money in like
manner integrated as a single pecuniary'res demandable in solido."0 5
The PrincipalCharacteristicsof Debt
As we have seen, the Real Action had these characteristics; first,
it sought the recovery of a specific res, such as a particular farm or
horse, which was demanded as an integral unity; second, the object
of recovery had to be capable of identification by name or other descriptive attribute, as a farm of a specific number of acres, or a barn
in a particular location; and third, the object sought to be recovered,
was not demanded by virtue of a Contract, or by reason of a Tort, but
the plaintiff, under the Law was entitled to it, and the defendant was
under a legal duty to surrender it. And, Debt, being a direct descendant of the Real Action known as the Writ of Right, was bound to display the same features. Accordingly, we find that the distinctive
Characteristics of a Debt were: "(1) Individuality, identity, integrity
or solidarity; (2) certainty, or a definite measure in respect of its
65 Keigwin, The Action of Debt, 31 Geo. L. J. 20 (1923).
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amount; and (3) a dueness in virtue of some legal obligation."" As
the third requirement is so obvious, our discussion will be directed to
the first two characteristics.
(I) The Identity of a Debt.-A debt consists of a thing integral
and individual in its nature, such as a flock of sheep or an integrated
aggregation of acres. In the same way a money debt is composed of
many dollars, yet what the creditor thinks about is not the individual
monetary units involved which constitute the amount due, but the
total amount as a whole. In the developmental period of Debt, what
a plaintiff sued for in Debt was a specific pecuniary entity, capable of
identification, recognizable by its own particular characteristics, of
which the amount due constituted one, the others being the origin and
circumstances by which the defendant came to owe the plaintiff. And
as the sum sought to be recovered in Debt was thus capable of specific
designation, having a descriptive name, it was said that the action
went for a debt eo nomine.
The characteristics of identity appears clearly when drawing the
distinction between Money due as a Debt as opposed to Money demandable as Damages. As, for example, if a lease under Seal contains a covenant that the lessee shall pay a sum certain by way of rent
and shall also keep the premises in repair. Under the first agreement, the rent due on each installment, as it accrues, is a specific and
certain sum of money, due by virtue of the covenant to pay it; each
accrued installment constitutes a pecuniary unit or body of money,
which, in the lessee's hands, is impressed with a right of the lessor. But
if the tenant fails to make the necessary and promised repairs, the
amount demandable is neither definite nor certain, that is, the Damages recoverable constitute an indeterminable and unrecognizable
amount, which must ultimately be segregated from the world's existing volume of money. Of course, the amount due by way of rent and
the amount payable as Damages might conceivably be the same;
nevertheless in each case the plaintiff proceeds upon a wholly different
theory of the wrong done him; in one case he sues in Debt, in the
other, Covenant; he seeks not to impose upon the defendant a liability
to respond in Damages, but a liability upon the defendant for a sum
7
certain of money to which the plaintiff has a right jus ad rem.
66 Id. at 32.
67 This distinction will assume greater significance when the difference between
Indebitatus Assumpsit and Debt comes to be considered, as it will give a partial explanation of the origin of the former action. Simonton v. Winter, 5 Pet. (U. S.) 141
(1831).
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In relation to the solidarity of a debt, it should be kept in mind
though a debt is stipulated to be paid in installments, it still constitutes a single res, as where one declares himself indebted in the sum
of $1,000, to be paid in monthly installments of $100. So phrased, the
debtor owes only one debt of $1,000, and hence the creditor may not
sue until the entire indebtedness becomes due; he cannot sue in Debt
on each successive accruing installment. In 1791, Lord Loughborough,
in Rudder v. Price,68 was unable to see "a substantial reason"69 for
such a view, but Professor Keigwin suggests that he had been confused by an imaginary analogy between Debt and Assumpsit. If, however, we keep in mind the Origin of Debt as a Real Action, it is clear
that any other holding would have been at variance with its fundamental theory, that is, that a debt is a pecuniary, specific res, in its
final analysis a Real Action-a Writ of Right for money and like its
prototype, recoverable in solido, not in fragmentary installments. Covenant, however, was available upon the accrual of each installment.
(II) The Certainty of a Debt.-Assuming a debt exists, by reason of its origin, it follows as a necessary corollary that the thingdebitum-is a certain sum, or body of money or other goods, capable
of description, identification and measurement. The debt consists of a
specific farm, a specific flock of sheep, a particular aggregation of
coins. Hence, as Blackstone so truly remarked, as late as 1769, that
in the Action of Debt "the plaintiff must prove the whole debt he
claims, or recover nothing at all. For the debt is one single cause of
action, fixed and determined; and which, therefore, if the proof varies
from the claim, cannot be looked upon as the same contract whereof
the performance is sued for. If, therefore, I bring an Action of Debt
for £30, I am not at liberty to prove a debt of £20 and recover a
Verdict thereon; any more than if I bring an Action of Detinue for
a horse, I can thereby recover an ox." 0 In accordance with the theory
of the action, that is, that it was proprietary in character, that the
plaintiff either owed the entire debt or none at all, as only a specific
res was to be recovered, it is said that Debt lies only for a sum certain,
8 1 H. B1. 547, 126 Eng. Rep. 314 (1791). For other cases recognizing the doctrine
as sound, see, English: The Birkenhead, Lancashire & Cheshire Junction Ry. Co. v.
Webster, 6 Exch. 277, 155 Eng. Rep. 546 (1851); Illinois: Hoy v. Hoy, 44 M1. 469
(1867); Maryland: Booth v. Hall, 6 Md. 1 (1854); Virginia: Peyton v. Harrison, 22
Grat. (Va.) 643 (1872).
60 Rudder v. Price, 1 H. B1. 547, 555, 126 Eng. Rep. 314, 318 (1791).
70 3 BLACKSTONE, Co rENTARIEs ON THE LAWS OF ENOLANn, C. IX, Wrongs, 154
(7th ed., Oxford 1775).
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a fixed amount, and that the plaintiff's demand must always be for a
liquidated quantity of money.
Thus, under the entire Common Law, where goods were sold and
delivered without a prior agreement as to the price to be paid, the
creditor could not recover in Debt. In a case decided in 1472, BRIAN,
C. J., declared: "If I bring cloth to a tailor to have a cloak made, if the
price is not determined before hand that I shall pay for the work, he
shall not have an action against me." 7' In Bladwell v. Sleggein, decided in 1562,72 COLLIN, C. J., directed the Jury to find for the defendant where the plaintiff sued in Debt for ;E20 and the defendant
proved that the debt was only for 20 marks. Twenty-six years later,
in 1578, in the famous case of Young v. Ashburnham,73 where a gentleman of quality, while in attendance at Court, put up in a local tavern,
without any agreement with the tavern owner as to the price, it was
held that Debt would not lie. It seems also that the rule requiring
strict conformity between the Allegations and Proof as to the amount
of the debt due also at first applied when Indebitatus or General Assumpsit was used as a remedy for debt. 74
(III) The Proprietary Character of Debt.-The proprietary
character of Debt, which it derived from its ancestor, the Writ of
Right, under which the demandant who sued to recover a five hundred
acre tract of land, either recovered it in its entirety, or not at all, was
conspicuous throughout its history, particularly in the early stages of
its development. As we have seen in the early Writ of Debt as found
in Glanvill, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant deforced him of his
debt, whether consisting of money or a chattel, and the defendant, the
debtor, was directed to render such debt to the owner-creditor without
delay. Like the Writ of Right for land, the action was based on the
concept of ownership, hence the Writ of Debt has been referred to by
Pollock and Maitland as the "Writ of Right for Money." 0 The relationship between the Writ of Debt and the proprietary action for land
-the Writ of Right-is shown by the fact that Trial by Battle might
Y. B. 12 Edw. IV, 9 (1472).
2 Dy. 219b, 73 Eng. Rep. 485.
73 3 Leo. 161, 74 Eng. Rep. 606.
74 Bagnal v. Sacheverell, Cro. Eliz. 292, pl. 5, 78 Eng. Rep. 546 (1593).
In Vaux v. Mainwaring, Fortescue 197, 92 Eng. Rep. 816 (1715), Cmxr J-usTicE
PAR:ER, in reference to the same problems declared: "If you bring Indebitatus Assumpsit
for £10 for a horse sold, if it were' sold for more or less, yet the plaintiff shall recover
what it was sold for; but if Debt be brought on that contract, if it comes out to be
more or less, the plaintiff cannot recover, for it is a praecipe quod reddat for so much
money in particular."
71
72

75 2 HIsTORY OF ENGzsr LAW, c. V, Contract, 206 (Cambridge 1895).
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be invoked in both cases. Street tells us, however, that Proof by
7
Battle has not been found in Actions of Debt. 1
In this connection it should be observed that the proprietary character of Debt was much more pronounced in Debt in the detinet, or
for a measurable or ponderable chattel, than it was in Debt in the
debet et detinet. In Debt in the detinet, or for chattels, the Form of
Debt which split off and became known as Detinue, the obligation to
pay survived the death of the debtor; but in Debt for money, the
obligation was regarded as purely personal, and hence perished with
the death of the debtor. It follows therefore that when the defendantdebtor died, in order for the Writ of Debt to be maintainable, it always had to be framed in the detinet only, whether the debt was for
chattels or for money.
(IV) The Effect in Debt of a Variance Between the Allegation
and the Proof.- Thus, in Debt a Variance between the Allegation and
the Proof was fatal, but in Indebitatus Assumpsit, the plaintiff was
permitted to recover what he proved. The decision in the Vaux case
served as an entering wedge, and in consequence in 1789, in the case
of M'Quillin v. Cox, or some seventy years later, it was held in Debt
on Simple Contract the plaintiff might recover even though there was
77
a Variance between what he Alleged and what he Proved to be due.
So that the modern rule in Debt, as in Indebitatus Assumpsit, is that
the action will lie for a sum certain, or any sum which may be reduced
to certainty by averment, or fixed by the Verdict of a Jury. Such a
rule, it must be observed, excludes from the Scope of Debt all those
cases wherein the extent of the plaintiff's recovery is of an indefinite
character, such as money claimed as Damages for a Tort or due for a
Breach of Contract, as in the case of a failure of a lessee to keep his
covenant to keep the demised premises in good repair. But this rule
of exclusion is subject to several exceptions which serve to confirm the
rule by reason of their conformity to the fundamental, underlying
principle involved; these exceptions are:
(A) Where Damages are Paid for the Detention of the Debt.When a plaintiff recovers the sum sued for in an Action of Debt, he is
76 3 STREET, FOUNDATIONS Or LEGAL LABILITy, c. XI, Action of Debt, 131 (Northport 1906).
7T Vaux v. Mainwaring, Fort. 197, 92 Eng. Rep. 816 (1715); M'Quillin v. Cox,
1 H. BI. 249, 126 Eng. Rep. 144 (1789). See, also, English: Aylett v. Lowe, 2 W. BI.
1221, 96 Eng. Rep. 719 (1778); Emery v. Fell, 2 T. R. 28, 100 Eng. Rep. 16 (1787);
Lord v. Houston, 11 East 62, 103 Eng. Rep. 927 (1809); Maine: Norriss v. School
District of Winsor, 12 Me. 293 (1835); Massachusetts: Van Deusen v. Blum, 18 Pick.
(Mass.) 221, 29 Am. Dec. 582 (1836).
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also entitled to be additionally compensated in the Form of Damages
for the defendant's wrongful detention of the debt. These Damages
are an incident, and not the fundamental ground of the action.
Chitty 78 has pointed out that such Damages are usually nominal, and
are not the chief objective as in Covenant and Special Assumpsit. The
Damages are computed by multiplying the amount of interest on the
debt by the legal rate for the period of detention of the debt. But this
allowance to the plaintiff of Damages over and above the principal
debt, it must be understood, is in no way inconsistent with the principle that Debt lies only for a sum certain and not for Damages, which
are merely an incident thereof.
(B) Where the Damages are Liquidated in Accordance With a
Prior Contingency or Stipuiation.-A second exception to the rule
which excludes from the Scope of Debt demands for Damages is that
which the plaintiff tries to recover where the amount due upon the
happening of some contingency or stipulation is liquidated. Thus, in
Mitchell v. McNabb79 where the plaintiff sold his business to the defendant, who promised under Seal, to pay a specified sum of money,
if he should later engage in the same business within a certain radius
of the original business, it was held that the plaintiff, upon the violation of the covenant, might recover in Debt, the liquidated amount due
upon Breach of the Agreement.
(C) Where Damages are Paidin the Form of a Penalty Upon the
Breach of a Bond.-Involving the same principle but a different factual situation from the preceding case, is the case where the performance of certain acts are agreed upon by the parties; and the performance is then secured by a bond, under which the obligor acknowledges that he is indebted to the obligee in a specific sum of
money, known and described as a Penalty, to be paid upon Breach of
the Engagement, but, nevertheless, subject to a condition that such
bond shall be void if the obligor fails to perform the acts agreed upon,
such, for example, as to perform the duties of his office faithfully, to
build a house or to deliver certain specified goods. Under such a Contract, upon failure of the obligor to perform the acts promised, the
sum stated as the Penalty for Breach of the Contract becomes due and
owing as a debt due to the obligee,-the Penalty being a device for
determining in advance the measure of the obligee's Damages for a
default.
78 1 CmTry, TEATISE ON PLEADING AND PARTIES TO ActIoN, WITH PRECEDENTS AND

FoRms, c. II, 108 (16th Am. ed. by Perkins, Springfield 1876).
79 58 Me. 506 (1870).
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Originally, under the Ancient Law, the entire Penalty was recovered even though the obligee may not have suffered Damages
amounting to as much as the Penalty. For a time this resulted in the
intervention of Equity, which computed the actual amount of the
Damages resulting from the obligor's default, and then, upon the payment of that sum by the obligor, require the obligee to give the obligor
a Release from any further liability upon the Judgment. In consequence, in order to retain their Jurisdiction, the Law Courts were
instrumental in securing the enactment of the Statute of 8 and 9
William III (1696-1698),8 o under which it was provided that when
suit was instituted upon such a bond, the Court should proceed to
take proof of the plaintiff's actual loss and have it assessed by the
Verdict, so that when the Judgment on the Verdict was entered, it
was entered for the full amount of the Penalty as provided for in the
Contract, but with the understanding that such Judgment was to be
regarded as satisfied by the payment of the Damages as assessed by
the Verdict. By this process, in reality, Actions of Debt were prosecuted for Damages; in legal theory, however, such actions were directed at the recovery of the Penalty, which constituted a sum certain,
and the Judgment which was entered was in form for that sum certain.
(D) Where, in Bargains for Goods or Services of an Undetermined Amount, the Damages are Computed Upon an Agreed Rate of
Payment for the Goods or Services Actually Taken or Rendered.In such cases, where the proposed transaction has been completed, the
price becomes due by the happening of events subsequent to the original agreement. And the amount due is figured by reference to the
agreed rate and to the goods and services accepted. This price, once
ascertained, is then deemed to have been fixed in advance. Thus, in
those cases where the amount to become ultimately due may be
determined by a previously established rule and by reference to certain
standards agreed upon by the parties, it may be said that the indebtedness thus accruing falls within the scope of the principle that Debt lies
for a sum capable of being reduced to a certainty.
In Ingledew v. Cripps,81 a question was raised on this point of
recovery bearing on a sum certain due, but in general the principle
was applied, and this doctrine was accepted by Blackstone. And in
the case of Hawkins v. Plomer,s decided in 1775, Chief Justice De80 C. 11, 8, 2 Halsbury's Statutes 591 (1696).

81 2 Ld. Raym. 814, 92 Eng. Rep. 43 (1702).
82 2 W. B!. 1048, 96 Eng. Rep. 616 (1776).
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Grey, presiding over the Court of Common Pleas, of which Blackstone was a member declared: "On the other question, we are equally
clear, that in an Action of Debt, which goes for a specific thing, the
whole must be recovered, or nothing.' 83 In 1778, in Aylett v. Lowe,84
a Motion for Nonsuit was overruled, where the defendant moved on
the ground that the plaintiff recovered a Verdict for £100, whereas he
had alleged £200 to be due. Again, with DeGrey and Blackstone on
the Bench, the Court said that "Justice had been done by the Verdict,
and the sum recovered was commensurate to the real debt."85 That
same year, in Walker v. Witter," Lord Mansfield, speaking for the
King's Bench, took the same view, and with its approval in 1789 by
the decision in McQuillan v. Cox87 the Modern Law on the point was
settled.
When Debt Lies
(I) In General.-We may say then, that Debt lies to enforce a
legal duty created by Contract, by Custom or by Record. The only
limitation upon such duty was the requirement that such duty be one
for the payment of a certain sum of money or for the delivery of an
ascertained amount of Measurable or Ponderable Chattels. It should
be understood however, that the term "contract," as used under the
Early Common Law, meant something quite different from our Modern
Conception of Contract; at Common Law; it was a technical term,
having either one of two meanings, that is, it might refer to what was
called a Simple (Executed) Contract, created by the passage of a
quid pro quo from the creditor to the debtor at the time the debt arose,
or it might be a contract in the Form of a Specialty. As an example
of the first type of Contract, which developed long before Special Assumpsit-the remedy for the breach of a Modern Contract-came into
existence, let us suppose that A says to B, "I will deliver to you five
cords of wood at ten dollars a cord," and B says, "Go ahead and
deliver it." A delivers the wood and B refuses to pay for it, whereupon
A brings Debt. The action lies because something physical-five
cords of wood-has passed to B-thus creating on his part an obligation to pay. This type of Common Law Contract, which was what was
meant when it was said that Debt lies to enforce a duty created by
83 Hawkins v. Plomer, 2 W. B1. 1048, 1049, 96 Eng. Rep. 616, 617 (1775).

84 2 W. B1. 1221, 96 Eng. Rep. 719 (1778).
85 Aylett v. Lowe, 2 W. B1. 1221, 1222, 96 Eng. Rep. at 719 (1778).
86 1 Doug. 1, 99 Eng. Rep. 1 (1778).
87 1 H. B1. 249, 126 Eng. Rep. 144 (1789).
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Contract, must be clearly distinguished from the term "Contract" as
used in Modern Contract Law.
The second Form of Contract for which the action was available
one
which was made by the parties under a Seal, which was known
was
as a Specialty, as for example, where A sells his business to B, and
agrees under Seal that he will not open a new business within a radius
of ten miles of his old establishment, and then Breaches his Undertaking. In such an instance, he is clearly liable in Debt on a Specialty. 8
Referring again to the statement that Debt lies on a Simple Contract, it must be emphasized that this phrase did not imply that the
lawyers of the day, when Debt was in its developmental period, were
thinking in terms of a modern promise. The defendant was regarded
as liable because he had received a benefit, which imposed upon him
an obligation to pay, and not because he had promised. In view of
the "element of reciprocity" involved in a Debt factual situation, it
could be referred to broadly as involving the Concept of Contract, but
the gulf separating this early Common Law Concept of Contract and
the Modern Concept of Contract becomes clear when it is realized that
while Mutual Promises-a Promise for a Promise-may create a Contract in the modern sense,8 9 Debt would not lie upon such an obligation unless a quid pro quo had passed from the plaintiff-creditor to the
9
defendant-debtor
(II) Debt for Rent as Illustrative of the OriginalNature of Debt
as a Real Action.-The Form of Debt for the recovery of rent reserved upon a freehold estate and the form for rent reserved upon a
term of years is directly traceable to the Origin of Debt as a Real
Action. In Both Forms of the Action money was the thing sought,
but only in the case of rent reserved upon a term of years was the
Modern Action of Debt available; a Real Action was required for
rent due upon an estate of freehold.
From the time Debt evolved from the Real Actions into a distinctly Personal Action, it was used to recover rent which was incidental to
personal property. But to the extent that rent grew out of real
property, nonpayment constituted a real injury, and hence not remediable in a Personal Action.
88 Mitchell v. McNabb, 58 Me. 506 (1870).
89 Smith v. Airey, 6 Mod. 128, 87 Eng. Rep. 885 (1704).
SO Firoor, HISTORY AND SouRcEs op TH COMMON LAW, c. 10, Debt, 225-226
(London 1949).
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Rent, a real obligation imposed primarily on land, 91 had to be
paid through the hands of the tenant. And there was no question as to
the application of Debt as a remedy for the recovery of rent granted
or reserved for years or at will. 9 2 According to Perry, 3 there was a

doubt as to whether a personal action could be sustained for the arrears
of a freehold rent, for example, like a life estate. It was urged that
such arrears, like a freehold estate in land, could be recovered in a
Real Action, thus confounding the profits of the rent (which are as
much personalty as wheat or corn served from the land) with the rent
itself. If, however, the rent was reserved for life, it seems that Debt
was not available at Common Law until after the termination of the
freehold estate, at which time Debt could be brought for the arrears.
94
Prior to that time, however, certain Real Actions, such as Cessavit
and others, were invoked to recover the arrears of freehold rents wherever a Distress would not lie. Naturally, the existence of such a higher
remedy was fatal to the use of Debt. Finally, however, the issue was
settled by the Statute of 8 Anne, c. 14 (1709) and 5 Geo. III, c. 17
(1765), under which Debt was permitted in such cases.
For the same reason which barred the use of a Personal Action
for the arrears of a freehold rent, Debt at Common Law was not available to recover a rent reserved in fee or in fee tail. In the latter case,
as the estate could never terminate, the plaintiff was always forced
to use a Real Action. This was the law until the Real Actions were
abolished by statute95 in 1833, at which time the issue arose as to
whether one who owned a rent charged in fee or in tail, by the abolition of the Real Actions, had been deprived of all remedy, with a
destruction of the right. In 1848, in the case of Varley v. Leigh,"0
Pollock, C. B., by way of dictum, took the view that since there was
no longer a real remedy for the recovery of rent charges in fee, Debt
might lie. But one of the other Judges felt that the right was no longer
91 See article by Williams, Landowners' Liability to Pay Rent Charges in Fee, 13
(1897).
92 See 1 Selwyn, Nisi Prius, c. XIV, 539 (13th ed. by David Keane & C. T. Smith
1869 London 2 Vols.). And in Cheney's Case, 3 Leo. 260, 74 Eng. Rep. 672 (1590), it
was held that Debt lay for rent even though the lease called for corn or other chattel.
93 COMMON-LAW PLEADIGO: ITS HISTORY AND PRINCIPLES, c. III, Of Forms of
L.

Q. REV. 288

Actions, 53 (Boston 1897).
94 "An obsolete writ, which could formerly have been sued out when the defendant
had for two years ceased or neglected to perform such service or to pay such rent as he
was bound to do by his tenure, and had not upon his lands sufficient goods or chattels
to be distrained. Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 208" Black's Law Dictionary, p. 288 (St. Paul, 1951).
95 3 & 4 Win. IV, c. 27 § 36.
96 2 Exch. 446, 154 Eng. Rep. 567.
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enforceable. But the issue was set at rest in 1873 in the case of
Thomas v. Sylvester, 7 which held that Debt would lie, taking the view
that the existence of a higher remedy-a Real Action-had constituted the principal impediment to the maintenance of Debt at Common Law, and that, with this obstacle removed, Debt was available.
And the case has since been followed s
(III) Debt as a Remedy to Enforce the Liability of the Heir for
the Debt of an Ancestor.-At Common Law Debt could not be maintained against a personal representative to recover a debt due to the
plaintiff from the estate of a deceased debtor. As against an heir,
however, Debt was available, if there was a bond or Specialty evidencing the debt and expressly binding the heir. But even where such a
bond existed and purported to bind the heir, the latter was liable only
as to the assets received from his ancestor by descent. As Street observes: "The law considers the bond of the ancestor, wherein the heir
is bound, as becoming, upon the death of the ancestor, the heir's own
debt in respect of the assets which the heir has in his own right, and
holds him liable on such bond to the value of the land descended,
'because the inheritance of the ancestor, which creates a lien upon the
heir, is possessed by the heir jure proprio and not aliens, as the personal estate is by the executor.' "" Bound only to the extent of the
value of the land received, the heir is relieved of any further liability,
once he had paid the ancestor's debts, or his debts up to the value of
the land received.
In Debt on a Specialty against an Heir at Law for a debt of his
ancestor, it is a good Defense to the heir to plead that he has received
nothing by descent (reins per descent). A false Plea of this character
by the heir made him liable for the entire debt. But this rule had no
application to an executor who was charged and who pleaded falsely.
He also was liable for the assets received, but the severe rule applied
to the heir did not apply to him. By Statute"° in 1830 the rule as to
the heir was changed. The same statute prevented the heir from evading liability for his ancestor's debt, by alienation of the descended
lands, before an action was instituted on the obligation (bond) of his
97 L. R. Q. B. 368.
98 In re Blackburn, etc. Bldg. Soc., 42 Ch. Div. 343 (1889).
99 3 FOUNDATIONS or LEGAL LiABmrTY, c. XI, The Action of Debt, 137 (Northport
1906), dting as authority, GILBERT, TREATISE ON THE ACTION or DEBT (printed in
GILBERT'S CArES 3n LAW AND EQUITY) 401 (Savoy, London 1790).

100 1 Win. IV, c. 47, 70 Statutes at Large 292.
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ancestor. The statute gives the same remedy to devisees jointly with
heirs, and against devisees alone if there be no heirs.
(IV) Debts Created by Simple Contracts and Debts Created by
Specialty Distinguished.-Aside from creating a Debt by Simple Real
Contract, debts were most frequently created by the execution and
delivery of a Sealed Obligation, commonly referred to as a Specialty
Contract. The theory of obligation underlying such a Contract differed
radically from that which was embodied in the Real Simple Contract.
The latter type of obligation, aside from its own intrinsic merit as
creative of a debt, might also be given the validity which would be
added by a Seal, but not on the same theory. The debt created by a
Sealed Contract was regarded as in the Nature of a Grant, with the
promise made binding only by reason of its form of expression, whereas the debt created by a Simple Real Contract was created by the
transfer of a quid pro quo,--something physical, such as a horse or a
specific sum of money-from the creditor to the debtor, under such
circumstances that the debtor was obligated, by Operation of Law, to
pay the creditor. A Specialty Debt, then, was created by the act or
deed of the obligor, the word "deed," said to be Anglo-Saxon in origin,
from "daed" being treated as a word of Grant. The English deed creating the Specialty Debt has been similarly regarded as a Grant, or as
evidence of a Grant, being sufficient in itself to create a debt by reason of its own peculiar form and solemnity, and without the passage of
any quid pro quo, as was essential in the case of a debt created by
Simple Contract. But the debt created by Specialty was subject to the
same limitation as the debt created by Simple Contract, that is, the
amount alleged to be due had to correspond to the amount proved
at the time. Thus, where the plaintiff counted upon a Grant for £200
and only proved that £140 was due, with the remaining amount, £60,
due by Simple Contract, he could not recover because of the Variance
as to his Allegation and Proof as well as to the Variance between the
Two Forms of Debt.1 "
(V) Debt as a Remedy Upon Negotiable Instruments.--Bills of
Exchange and Promissory Notes originally came from the Civil Law
and under the Law Merchant created debts, but not debts in the
Common Law sense. In consequence, in tracing the development of
Debt as a remedy upon Negotiable Instruments, our point of departure
is that such instruments originally could not be sued upon at Common Law.
101 Y. B. 3 Edw. 1n, 78 (1309).

19581

THE ACTION OF DEBT

(A) Bills of Exchange.-According to Street, 0 2 the Earliest
Actions in the Common Law Courts on Bills of Exchange were in
Special Assumpsit. With the recognition that under the Custom of
Merchants Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes created a legal
duty, or an obligation remediable by Special Assumpsit, it is said
that gradually Special Assumpsit gave way to what is described as a
Specialized Action on the Case in the Nature of Assumpsit. Thus,
in the case of Oaste v. Taylor, decided in 1612,103 where the plaintiff
declared upon the Custom of Merchants, but failed to include Allegations as to either the Consideration or the Promise, the action was
treated in the nature of a Special Action on the Case in the Nature of
Assumpsit. The same doubt was expressed in Starke v. Cheeseman'0 4
by Chief Justice Holt.
If Debt and Special Assumpsit were to be extended into the Field
of Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes, it could be done only by
the expansion of the legal theory under which the concept of duty as
derived from the Law Merchant could be assimilated to the idea of
duty imposed by Operation of Law and to the legal duty derived from a
Simple Promise. In this connection, it should be remembered that Debt
is the proper remedy to enforce a pure legal duty to pay a sum certain
of money, whereas Special Assumpsit is the proper remedy to enforce
a duty derived from a Promise Not Under Seal. The issue was clearly
presented in an Anonymous case, decided in 1668,05 in which an
Action of Debt was brought by the payee against the acceptor, and
the Court held that Debt would not lie, giving as reasons, first, there
was no Privity of Contract0 0 between the parties; and second, that
102 3 FOUNDATIONS or LEGAL Lm n=r, c. XI, The Action of Debt, 139 (Northport 1906).
103 Cro. Jac. 306, 79 Eng. Rep. 262.
104 1 Ld. Raym. 538, 91 Eng. Rep. 1259 (1700). See, also, the case of Vanheath v.
Turner, Wich 24, 124 Eng. Rep. 20 (1622), in which the arguments of counsel revealed
great uncertainty as to whether the action was in Case or in Special Assumpsit.
In Welsh v. Craig, 8 Mod. 373, at 373, 88 Eng. Rep. 265, at 266 (1724), the Court
observed: "By the custom of merchants no remedy was given on foreign bills of exchange, but by action on the case. The Statute of 8 & 9 Wm. Iii, c. 17 [1696], gave
the same remedy upon inland bills of exchange; and 3 & 4 Anne, c. 9, 1 [1704] to
promissory notes."
1o Hardres, 485, 145 Eng. Rep. 560.
106 On the question of privity, in Raborg v. Peyton, 15 U. S. 385, 387, 4 L. Ed.

268, 269 (1817), Mr. Justice Story said: "It is very difficult to perceive how it can be
correctly affirmed, that there is no privity of contract between the payee and acceptor.
There is, in the very nature of the engagement, a direct and immediate contract between
them. The consideration may not always, although it frequently does, arise between
them; but privity of contract may exist, if there be an express contract, although the
consideration of the contract originated aliunde. Besides, if one person deliver money to
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acceptance was only in the nature of a Collateral Promise to pay the
debt of another, which, is was said, did not create a duty. Chief
Justice Hale appeared anxious to support the action as he felt that
such a result would lead the -Courts to hold that Indebitatus Assumpsit
might serve as a remedy for the recovery of a certain amount of money
on an accepted bill. The issue was whether the duty as created by the
Bill was one which the Common Law recognized as having in fact
created a Common-Law Duty. While the acceptance of the Bill
clearly amounted to a Promise to pay the money, Hale was doubtful
as to whether it created a Common-Law Debt. Accordingly, the
remedy was held to lie in a Special Action on the Case and not in
Debt. Street suggests that the Court was not only influenced by the
"absence of affirmative precedent on this question," 0 7 but that the
result was also affected by the erroneous notion that the drawee, in
accepting a bill, thereby promised to pay the debt of another, the
drawer. What was in the mind of the Court was that such a view
implied that the Promise of the Acceptor was collateral or secondary
to the Liability of the Drawer, that is, that it involved the acceptance
which was in the nature of a collateral engagement to pay the debt,
and that at Common Law such a Collateral Promise or Guaranty could
never be enforced by Debt. So far as Debt was concerned the law was
temporarily settled. Two years later, however, in 1670, in the case of
Brown v. London,"8 the issue arose in another aspect-as to whether
Indebitatus would lie against an Acceptor? It was there suggested that
one person delivers money to another, who draws a Bill upon himself
and accepts the same payable to a third person, such third person
might sue the Acceptor in Indebitatus Assumpsit for the money received to his use, the liability being one created by the Common Law,
and not solely by the Law Merchant.
(B) Promissory Notes.-At Common Law an Action of Debt
could not be maintained upon a Promissory Note on the theory that
it imported a debt. The plaintiff was required to declare upon the
contract, as in Assumpsit, stating and proving the real Consideration
at large. Though it was not feasible to declare on the note, it might
be offered in evidence to support the Contract stated, as- for example,
another, for the use of a third person, it has been settled, that such a privity exists, that
the latter may maintain an action of debt against the bailee." Harris v. De Bervoir,
Croc. Jac. 687, [79 Eng. Rep. 596 (1624)].
107 3 FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LABr.ITy, c. XI, The Action of Debt, 141 (Northport 1906).
108 11 Mod. 225, 86 Eng. Rep. 1005.
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on a Count for money lent. With the progressive advancement of

commerce, the need developed for a less complicated instrument than
a Bill of Exchange; and hence Promissory Notes came into vogue. But

the effort to bring Debt upon them, as of themselves importing a
Common-Law Debt, was vigorously opposed to Lord Holt,

e0

who

considered both Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes, and particularly the latter, as innovations upon the Common Law. He insisted

that they were merely evidences of debt, and that Declarations upon
them amounted to setting up a new sort of Specialty unknown in
Westminster."" To bring an end to this controversy, Parliament en-

acted in 1705, the State 3 & 4 Anne, c. IX, 1, which provided that all
notes signed by a person, promising to pay to another, his order or
bearer, any sum of money, should be construed to be, by virtue thereof, due and payable to any person, to whom the same is made payable.
The effect of this statute was that an Action of Debt might be maintained on a Promissory Note without Alleging a Consideration, and
without proving any Consideration."I

Such was in substance the situation when in 1724 the case of
Welsh v. Craig" was decided. On the theory that the Maker of a

Note occupied the same position in law as the Acceptor of a Bill of
Exchange, the Court, notwithstanding the Statute, began consideration
of the problem by holding that Debt would not lie upon a Promissory
Note. Three quarters of a century later, in Bishop v. Young," 3 which
involved Debt by the Payee of a Promissory Note against the Maker,

Lord Eldon held that the Action would lie, thus bringing into serious
question the doctrine of the Welsh case. Sweeping aside the idea that

the Collateral Engagement theory which applied to Bills of Exchange,
also applied to Promissory Notes, Lord Eldon said that the Maker of

a note owed the debt, and was primarily and finally responsible for
109 Brown v. Harraden, 4 T. R., 148, 100 Eng. Rep. 943 (1791).

110 Pearson v. Garrett, Comb. 227, 90 Eng. Rep. 444 (1693); Clerke v. Martin, 2
Ld. Raym. 757, 92 Eng. Rep. 6 (1702); Story v. Atkins, 2 Ld. Raym. 1430, 92 Eng. Rep.
430 (1739); Trier v. Bridgman, 2 East 359, 102 Eng. Rep. 406 (1802).
ll Peasley v. Boatwright, 2 Leigh (Va.) 195 (1830).
It is interesting to note that some twenty-five years after the Statute of 3 & 4
Anne, c. IX, § 1 (1705), Virginia's Colonial Assembly, 4 Nenning's Statute at Large, c.
V, 2773-5 (1830) enacted that "to the end the recovery of money upon promissory notes,
and other writings without seal, may be rendered more easy &c. if any person shall
sign any note, or by any other writing shall promise and oblige himself, to pay any sum
of money, or quantity of tobacco, to any other person, such person to whom the money
&c. is payable, shall and may commence an Action of Debt, and recover Judgment for

what shall appear to be due thereupon with costs."
112 8 Mod. 373, 88 Eng. Rep. 265 (1724).
113 2 B. & P. 78, 126 Eng. Rep. 1166 (1800).
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it; it could not be said that the engagement of the defendant was
collateral; it was to pay his own debt, and the action of the plaintiff
was to enforce its payment. 114 In 1816, in the case of Stratton v.
Hi!, 11 it was held, under the influence of Lord Eldon's view, that
Debt would lie by an Indorsee against a party drawing, accepting and
endorsing a Bill upon himself, as the subsequent indorsement of the
drawer of the Bill did not make him less amenable to the liability
which he was already under. The year 1823, in Priddy v. Henbrey,"01
saw it held that the Drawer of a Bill could sustain an Action of Debt
against the Acceptor where the bill was said to have been drawn for
value. The acceptance of a Bill of that character was said to amount
to an admission of the receipt of assets and that the Acceptor was a
debtor to that extent to the original Drawer of the Bill. Seventeen
years later, in Watkins v. Woke," 7 the court held that Debt could be
supported by an Indorsee against his Immediate Indorser, the indorsement, like the acceptance of the Bill in the Priddy case, being regarded
as an admission of the existence of a debt, value having been given for
the endorsement. It was also said by the Court through Baron Parke
that the indorsement not only involved an admission of a debt, but also
operated as an Implied Promise to pay if the acceptor failed to pay.
And in Hatch v. Trayes,11 decided in 1840, it was made clear that
the failure to recite value received did not prevent the Drawer of a
Bill from suing the Acceptor, nor the Payee of a Promissory Note from
suing the maker, in Debt. Thus, it became well-settled law in England
that Debt was available by the Holder against his Immediate Indorser,
whether the instrument was a Bill of Exchange or a Promissory Note.
But it was equally well-settled that Debt would not lie against remoted
parties.19
(C) The Situation in the United States.-The issue as to whether
Debt would lie by a Remote Indorsee against the Acceptor of a Bill of
Exchange was clearly presented in Raborg v. Peyton. 2 ° In holding
that the action would lie, in an opinion rendered by Mr. Justice Story,
who was a recognized authority on Negotiable Instruments, the United
States Supreme Court advanced our remedial law from the point where
114

Ibid.

115 3 Price 253, 146 Eng. Rep. 253 (1816).

118 1 B. & C. 674, 107 Eng. Rep. 248.
117 7 M. & IV. 488, 151 Eng. Rep. 858 (1841).
118 11 Ad. & E. 702, 113 Eng. Rep.
119 Cloves v. Williams, 3 Bing. (N. C.) 868, 132 Eng. Rep. 645 (1837).
120 15 U. S. 385, 4 L. Ed. 268 (1817).
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the English Courts called a halt. Referring to the Anonymous case,
in which it was held that Debt would not lie by the payee of a Bill of
Exchange against the Acceptor, because of a lack of privity between
the parties; and because an acceptance was in the nature of a collateral
promise, which did not create a duty to pay, Mr. Justice Story held
that where one party delivered money to another, for the use of a third
party, privity did exist, that wherever the Common Law raised a duty,
Debt lay, and that an acceptance was not a collateral engagement to
pay the debt of another, but an absolute engagement to pay the money
to the Holder of the Bill. And what Story did in the Raborg case for
Bills of Exchange was done for Promissory Notes in the New York
case of Wilmarth v. Crawford,2 2 in which it was held that Debt would
lie by the Indorsee against the Maker of a Promissory Note, on the
theory, as decided in Pierce v. Crafts,123 that where Indebitatus Assumpsit was available, Debt might also be brought.
Aside from the technical steps by which the end was achieved, as
a pragmatic matter, how were the Actions of Debt and Indebitatus
Assumpsit made available as remedies on Negotiable Instruments?
What actually happened was something like this: originally these
debts had no standing in the Common-Law Courts, although in the
Law Merchant the Bill of Exchange and Promissory Note were recognized as creating debts, which were remediable in the Law Merchant
Courts. When, however, the pressure of commercial and mercantile
interests developed, a demand arose for more expeditious remedies,
and at this time the litigants began to look in the direction of the Common Law. As the debts created by these instruments were not
Common-Law Debts, as they were a product of the Civil Law, they
were both looked at askance by the Common-Law Courts. As we have
seen, Lord Holt regarded the instruments, which gave rise to these
Law Merchant Debts, as innovations upon the Common Law, and
hence he vigorously resisted efforts to make them remediable in the
Common-Law Courts. But, as we have seen, by a gradual relaxation
of the rule against making such obligations remediable at Common
Law, the Law Merchant Concept of a Debt as created by the Law
121 Hardes, 485, 145 Eng. Rep. 560 (1668).
122 10 wend. (N. Y.) 340 (1833). See, also, the following cases: Alabama: Carroll
v. Meeks, 3 Port. (Ala.) 226 (1836); New York: Onondaga County Bank v. Bates, 3
Hill (N. Y.) 53 (1842); Tennessee: Anderson v. Crockett, 6 Yerg. (Tenn.) 330 (1834);
West Virginia: Regnault v. Hunter, 4 W. Va. 257 (1870); Federal: Kirkman v. Hamilton,
6 Pet. (U. S.) 20 (1832).
123 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 90 (1815).
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Merchant was assimilated to the concept of Debt at Common Law.
Once a Law Merchant Debt was thus recognized as having the same
standing in the Common-Law Courts as did Common-Law Debts, it
followed logically that the Common-Law Remedies upon CommonLaw Debts-Debt and Indebitatus Assumpsit-would become available as Remedies thereon, and that is what actually happened.
(VI) Debt as a Remedy Upon Quasi-ContractualDuties.-Dr.
Jackson, in his splendid contribution entitled "The History of QuasiContract," states: "One of the earliest and indisputable cases of recovery of money on a total failure of Consideration occurs in connection with such a Contract to Purchase Land. In 1294, Metingham, C.
J., was clear that if one covenants to convey land for money paid,
and the land is not conveyed, 'in that case I may choose whether I
will demand the money by Writ of Debt, or demand by Writ of Covenant that he perform his covenant.'

the
Dr.
the
the

124

No subsequent case, offering

plaintiff an alternative, has been found, a fact accounted for by
Jackson as an example of the Equity Jurisdiction exercised by
Common-Law courts,' 25 but which Jurisdiction was laid aside in
early part of the Fourteenth Century. The following Century,

however, according to Professor Fifoot,12 saw several claims for what

would now be called Actions to Recover Money Had and Received to
the plaintiff's use, citing an Anonymous case decided in 1368.12
Several Centuries later, in the case of Speake v. Richards,'28 in 1618,
the issue as to whether Debt would lie upon a Quasi-Contractual Duty
was clearly presented and determined. The plaintiff declared in Debt
against a Sheriff to recover money taken by him under an Execution
and thereafter wrongfully withheld from the plaintiff. At the Trial it
was urged that the action was not available as there was no Contract
between the plaintiff and the Sheriff. Holding such an argument beside
the point, the Court ruled that "though there was no actual Contract
yet there was a king of Contract in Law, so it is ex quasi contractu.The
term "Quasi Contract," thus used, has since been adopted as the name
descriptive of those obligations where goods or services are received
under such circumstances as not to create a strict Common-Law Debt.
124 Pt. I, 6(c), 20, 21 (Cambridge 1936). The citation of the case referred to by
Dr. Jackson is Y. B. 21 & 23 Edw. I. (R. S.) 598 (1294).
125 Equity Jurisdiction.

128 HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMmON LAw, c. 10, Debt, 222, 223, (London

1949).
1
127 Y. B. 41 Edw. III, f. 10, p . 5.
128 Hob. 206, P1. 260, 80 Eng. Rep. 353.
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Such obligations, not originating in Contract in the modern sense, were
expected to be paid. And a remedy was found by giving the aggrieved
party in such cases an Action of Debt, and by extending the Action
of Indebitatus Assumpsit into the field through the use of the Common
Counts.
(VII) Debt as a Remedy for Penalties and Customary Duties.
-As Pollock and Maitland 2 9 have pointed out, by the time of Edward I (1272-1307), Debt was rarely used except for five purposes,
that is, to recover Money Lent, the Price of Goods Sold, arrears of
Rent Due upon a Lease for Years, Money Due from a Surety,1 0 and a
Fixed Sum Promised by a Sealed Document. There was, of course,
nothing in the nature of Debt to prevent its use in all cases where there
was a legal duty to pay a specific amount of either money or chattels,
whether such duty arose from a Covenant, 131 a Grant by Specialty or
from a Simple Contract. Statutory penalties, forfeitures under bylaws, amerciaments inflicted by Inferior Courts, Customary Duties, and
Debts Acknowledged of Record, were all regarded as within the Scope
of the Action. Thus, Debt was available to recover a Penalty prescribed in a lease; 1 32 for an Amerciament recovered in a Court Baron
or Court Leet; 13 3 or for a Fine due by Custom for Breach." 4 And where
an Act of Parliament had imposed a forfeiture of five pounds for the
practice of medicine in London without a license, it was held that the
College of Physicians, to which the forfeiture inured, could sustain an
Action of Debt to recover the amount forfeited, even in the advance
of any provision therefore in the Statute. 135
(VIII) Debt as a Remedy Upon Judgments.-One of the earliest
cases on the right to recover money in an Action of Debt is a Year
Book case.' 36 If we may believe the plaintiff's argument in that case,
the test of the right to maintain the action is whether the demand had
been turned into a duty by Judgment on the original money claim.
Thus, we find that once the Damages in a Real Action were reduced
to certainty by a Judgment, Debt became available to recover the
same. And where Judgment was rendered and Damages recovered in
129 2 HISTORY or ENGLISH LAW, C. V, 208 (Cambridge 1895).

130 Cf. HorIa s, THE CoaioN LAW, Lecture VII, CONTRACT, 264 (Boston 1881).
131 Anonymous, 1 Leo. 208, pl. 290, 74 Eng. Rep. 191 (1589).
132 Cibel v. Hill, 1 Leo. 110, 74 Eng. Rep. 102 (1587).
133 Castle v. Osman, 1 Leo. 203, 74 Eng. Rep. 187 (1588).
134 Y. B. 11 Hen. VII, 13, pl. 8 (1495).
135 1 ROLLE, ABRIDGM'ENT DES PLUSIEURS CASES ET RESOLUTIONS DEL COmmoN LEY,

598, pl. 18 (London 1668).
136 Y. B. 43 Edw. III, 2, pl. 5 (1369).
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the Courts of London, in an Action on a Custom of that City, it was
held that Debt could be grounded on such a Judgment, although the
Courts at Westminster had no Jurisdiction over the original cause.187
Nor was it a valid objection to Debt on a Judgment that the previous
Judgment had been in an Action of Debt. 3 The effect of securing a
Judgment on a money claim was to convert it into a legal duty, upon
which Debt could be maintained. 189
The Obsolescence of Debt as a Remedy
THE Action of Debt was subject, as we have stated, to two great
handicaps; First, to the requirement of extreme particularity in the
statement of the sum due; Second, to the fact that a defendant might
defeat a ligitimate claim by insisting upon Trial by Wager of Law.
All simple debts were subject to Defense by Wager of Law, but Debts
of Record and Specialty Debts were not. This was the situation in
1602 when Slade's Case4 . was decided, holding that Debt and Indebitatus Assumpsit were concurrent remedies in the Field of Debt on
Simple Contract. The practical effect of the decision was to enable a
plaintiff, suing on a Simple Contract, to evade the Defense of Wager
of Law, by framing his Declaration in Indebitatus Assumpsit, which
was not subject to that Mode of Defense, rather than in Debt. "The
venerable Jenkins, in the time of the Commonwealth,' 4 1 along with
the old practitioners, regarded this aspect of Slade's Case as one of the
2
worst abuses which in his day had crept into the Common Law.1
And in Edgecomb v. Dee,143 Chief Justice Vaughan spoke of the holding as an "illegal revolution," involving the notion that every Contract
Executory Implied a Promise, and that this idea, which constituted the
basis of Slade's Case, was nothing but a false gloss whereby Actions of
Debt were converted into Actions on the Case, but such protests were
of no effect. Indebitatus Assumpsit, the superseding action, was also
aided by the fact that Debt was not available to recover against the
representatives of a decedent.
137 1 ROLLE, ABRIDGMENT DES PLUSIEURS CASES ET RESOLUTIONS DEL COMMoN LEY,

600, pl. 8 (London 1668).
138Id. pl. 6, 7.
139 The difference between suit on judgments rendered in courts of record and
courts not of record, at common law and under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
Constitution will be treated later.
140 4 Co. 92b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1074 (1603).
141 3 STRE, FOUNDATIONS or LEGAL L.amrry, c. XI, The Action of Debt, 138
(Northport 1906).
142 Ibid.
143 Vaughan 101, 124 Eng. Rep. 990 (1670).
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The Revival of Debt
As we have seen, as far as Debt goes, the Defense of Wager of
Law became obsolete after the decision in Slade's Case'44 in 1603, in
which it was held that Debt and Indebitatus Assumpsit were concurrent remedies. As the latter action was not subject to Wager of
Law, persons seeking to recover a debt naturally used the Action of
Indebitatus Assumpsit, which was not subject to that Mode of Defense. Officially, however, the Final Abolition of Wager of Law did
not occur until 1833, at which time, as an aftermath of the decision in
King v. Williams,1 45 it was ended by statute. 46 Thereafter, during the
remainder of the Eighteenth Century, Debt recovered some of the
ground lost after Slade's Case, as procedurally, it was more expeditious
than Assumpsit, the Judgment being Final in the first instance. Moreover, the Statute Abolishing Wager of Law authorized Debt as a
remedy against the personal representative, and this helped in the
process of reinvigoration. But this effort was too little and too late,
as all the Forms of Action were to be swept away by the Common Law
Procedure Acts.
II.

SCOPE OF THE ACTION

The Nature of the Obligation'4 of a Debt, Causa Debendi
As Debt was, and, in its nature, is a Real Action, the object of
which is to recover a res which belongs to the plaintiff, it is, as we have
previously pointed out at length, proprietary in character. 48 By this
144 4 Co. 92b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1074 (1603).
145 4 D. & R. 206, 107 Eng. Rep. 483 (1824).
146 3 & 4 Win. IV, c. 42, § 13 (1833).
147 The Action of Debt was the common law's remedy for the enforcement of its
earliest known obligations. See article by Pollock, Contracts in Early English Law, 6
HARv. L. REv.
148 "This

50 (1893).

Action of Debt was nothing in essence but an action for the recovery of
money unjustly detained, together with Damages for the said wrongful detention, such.
Damages being claimed, not in the Writ, but in the plaintiff's first Count." See article
by Stone, Debt at the Time of the Year Books, 36 L. Q. REV.61, 62 (1920). See, also, 3
HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY o ENGLISH LAW, c. III, Contract and Quasi-Contract, 425 (3d
ed. Boston 1927).
An Action for the Recovery of a Debt was thought of as like an action for the
recovery of a book lent, or for the recovery of a plot of land which the defendant unjustly detained from the plaintiff.
This crude and primitive Common-Law Conception of Debt, that the creditor was
demanding the return of his own money, and that the action was "proprietary" or
"real," seems to be somewhat overemphasized by many legal scholars. See article by
Henry, Consideration in Contracts, 601 A.D. to 1256 AD., 26 YALE L. J. 664, 690-694
(1917).
Debt was indeed a "proprietary action," in the sense of being the vindication or enforcement of a right. The Judgment was not for Damages for breach of promise, but
for recovery of the debt itself. See Chief Justice Vaughan, in Edgcombe v. Dee, Vaughan
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we mean it does not lie for Damages as reparation for a Tort, nor does
it proceed upon the theory that the plaintiff's right to recover, or the
defendant's obligation to surrender the property sued for, is grounded
upon a Promise. In both cases the property sought, whether land, a
corporeal chattel, or a sum of money is demanded because the defendant is withholding something which rightfully belongs to the
plaintiff.149
(I) Title as tke Basis of the Action of Debt.-Thus, if the plaintiff is to recover, it must be on the basis of some form of title, clear
or any claim grounded in Tort and independent of any Promise. There
are two possibilities as to such title: (1) where the goods or money
in issue were originally the property of the plaintiff and his claim to
recover is based on a prior vested interest, as, for example, where A
bailed a chattel to B, or B wrongfully took A's chattel; or (2) where
originally the property was the property of the defendant, the present
possessor, but as a result of the happening of some subsequent event,
89, 124 Eng. Rep. 984 (1670); Awms,

LEcTuREs

ON LEGAL HISTORY, Lecture XIV,

Implied Assumpsit, 148, 150-151 (Cambridge 1913).
It is said that the duty to restore the money arose not because the debtor had
promised or contracted to pay, but because of some transaction, as that he had borrowed
it or received value, known as quid pro quo. But the promise or agreement to pay the
price was just as much a part of the debt transaction as the delivery of the res. See
article by Henry, Considerationin Contracts, 601 A.D. to 1256 A.D., 26 YALE L. J. 664,
694 (1917).
In Debt the word "agreed" must be used instead of "promised," but this is mere
form. McGinnity v. Laguerenne, 5 Gil. (Il.) 101 (1848).
Today it would seem that the idea of debt being created solely by the receipt of
quid pro quo and not by the promise or agreement to pay for it, is outgrown. Today a
promise may be regarded as giving rise to an enforceable duty to pay at least where
the consideration for the promise is executed. The only reason why Debt will not lie
upon a bilateral contract to enforce a promise to pay the price of goods to be delivered
is that by the doctrine of implied conditions such promise does not give to an absolute
duty to pay until the title has passed or the consideration has been fully executed.
Then Debt or Indebitatus Assumpsit will lie to enforce the duty to pay.
149 On Debt for the recovery of a specific amount of unascertained chattels, see
Arns, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY, Lecture XVIII, 89 (Cambridge 1913).
This action gives specific enforcement of the duty to pay. It gives the specific thing
demanded, namely, the recovery of a debt eo nomine and in numero, and not merely

the recovery of damages. 1 CHiTY,
WITH PRECEDENTS AND FopMs, c. II,

TREATISE ON PLEADING AND PARTIES To ACTION,

121 (16th Am. ed. by Perkins, Springfield 1876);
Tennessee: Thompson v. French, 8 Tenn. 452 (1837); Virginia: Minnick v. Williams,
77 Va. 758 (1883).
The action does not lie for the breach of a sealed contract to convey land, or to
recover purchase money paid. The action being for the breach, and not for a sum of
money eo nomine and in numero, it should be Covenant. Harper v. Lucas, 50 Il. 436
(1869).
It would lie to recover the purchase money as a debt arising from the obligation
created by law to repay it as money had and received. The terms "sum certain" and
debt eo nonine and in numero are used to distinguish a claim for a liquidated debt from
a claim for unliquidated damages, which are not ascertainable in amount.
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he ought, debet, to deliver it to the plaintiff who has become entitled
to recover it, as in the instance of a forfeiture previously mentioned.
If the plaintiff's claim is based on a previously vested title, he is demanding the land, chattel or money as a jus in re, that is, a right
which belongs to a person, absolutely and immediately, in a thing; if,
however, the plaintiff's claim is grounded on a right to a thing now in
the defendant's possession, a res which as yet has never been in the
plaintiff's possession, but to which, as in the forfeiture case earlier
referred to, the plaintiff, by operation of law is presently entitled to
have; this right of the plaintiff to have the thing is known as a jus
ad rem, or a right which belongs to a person only mediately and relatively, and has for its foundation an obligation incurred by a particular
person.
In the Personal Action of Debt-Detinue, both forms of title were
available, that is, the plaintiff in such action might recover because
the goods or the money belonged to him originally or because, by
Operation of Law, or otherwise, he had acquired a right to recover the
property which as yet was still in the defendant's possession. And it
was this distinction as to title which ultimately led to the differentiation between Debt in the Detinet and Debt in the Debet et Detinet;
that is, between the situation in which A bailed his horse, Damascus,
to B, for thirty days and where A loaned B $500 for thirty days; in
the first case, B acquired possession, but not title, hence when A sues
B at the end of the thirty days, after demand, he is relying on a prior
vested title, a jus in re; in the second case, B acquired both possession
and title, hence when A sued B to recover the $500, he was suing by
virtue of an accruing title, a jus ad rem.
(II) Debt in the Detinet, or for Goods not Pecuniary.-In theory
at least that Form of the Action which lay for the recovery of a certain quantity of specified goods and chattels, may still be maintained
upon an Executed Contract. 5 ' Apparently the last case in which Debt
150 Debt will lie on any Simple Contract to recover money due upon an Executed
Consideration, whether the contract is verbal or written, express or implied. People v.
Dummer, 274 Ill. 637, 113 N. E. 934 (1916).
Simple Contract Debts, of course, must be founded on a quid pro quo or Executed
Consideration. See article by Ames, Parol Contracts Prior to Assumpsit, 8 HARv. L.
REV. 252 (1895).
It also lies to enforce a quasi contractual obligation to pay a sum certain. Van
Deusen v. Blum, 18 Pick. (Mass.) 221, 29 Em. Dec. 582 (1836).
Debt also lies at the suit of a person entitled to costs in an action, either as a party
or as an officer, there being an implied contract. Doyle v. Wilkinson, 120 Ill. 430, 11

N. E. 890 (1887).
In Barber v. Chester County, 1 Chest. Co. (Pa.) 162 (1796), it was said that Debt
would lie wherever Indebitatus Assumpsit is maintainable. District of Columbia v.
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was used to recover specific chattels was that of the Earl of Falmouth
v. George,' decided in 1828, in which the plaintiff sought to recover a
certain number of fishes alleged to be due by way of toll for the use by
the fishing boats of a capstan which the plaintiff maintained on the
shore. The Action was said to be Debt in the Detinet, the Allegation
that the defendant debet, being omitted. In 1769, Blackstone 1 2
observed that this Form of Debt was "neither more nor less than a
mere Writ of Detinue," and he insisted that nothing but money could
constitute a debt, which view has been approved by certain American
53
courts.1
Keigwin, however, declares: "As a matter of historical fact,
Detinue and Debt for goods have always been distinct, the former
lying for goods previously the property of the plaintiff, and going upon
his jus in re, while Debt in the detinet, went for a body of goods to
Washington & G. R. Co., 1 Mackey (D. C.) 361, 382 (1882); 3 STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF
LEGA LiABmry, c. XI, The Action of Debt, 133 (Northport 1906).
It also lies to enforce a quasi-coniractual obligation to pay a sum certain. I CI t,
TREATISE ON PLEADING AND PARTIES TO

AcTIoN, WIT

PRECEDENTS AND

Fonts, c. II, 122

(16th Am. ed. by Perkins, Springfield 1876); English: Speake v. Richards, Rob. 207,
80 Eng. Rep. 353 (1617); Tennessee: Young v. Hawkins, 4 Yerg. (Tenn.) 171 (1833).
It will lie to recover money lent, money paid by the plaintiff for the use of the
defendant, money had and received by the defendant for the use of the plaintiff, or the
balance due on an Account Stated; 1 CniTTi, TREATISE ON PLEADING AND PARTIES TO
AcTroN, WITH PRECEDENTS AND Fons, c. II, 122 (16th Am. ed. by Perkins, Springfield
1876); English: Speake v. Richards, Hob. 207, 80 Eng. Rep. 353 (1617); Tennessee:
Young v. Hawkins, 4 Yerg. (Tenn.) 171 (1833).
Debt will lie to recover interest due on the loan or forbearance of money; English:
Herries v. Hamieson, 5 T. R. 553, 101 Eng. Rep. 310 (1794); Pennsylvania: Sparks v.
Garrigues, 1 Bin. (Pa.) 152 (1806); for work and labor; Comyn Digest, "Debt" B
(Philadelphia 1824); Maine: Serreto v. Rockland, S. T. & H. Ry. Co., 101 Me. 140, 63
A. 651 (1906); Tennessee: Thompson v. French, 18 Tenn. 452 (1837); work, labor and
materials; Smith v. Proprietors of First Congregational Meeting House in Lowell, 8
Pick. (Mass.) 178 (1829).
Debt will lie for goods Sold and Delivered, or Bargained and Sold. English: Emery
v. Fell, 2 T. R. 28, 100 Eng. Rep. 16 (1787); Federal: Dillingham v. Skein, 1 Hempst.
181 Fed. Cas. No. 3, 912a (1832).
Debt will lie for the Use and Occupation of land. English: Egler v. Marsden, 5
Taunt. 25, 128 Eng. Rep. 595 (1813); Wilkins v. Wingate, 6 T. R. 62, 101 Eng. Rep.
436 (1794); King v. Fraser, 6 East 348, 102 Eng. Rep. 1320 (1805); Arkansas: Trapnall
v. Merrick, 21 Ark. 503 (1860); New York: McKeon v. Whitney, 3 Denio (N. Y.) 452
(1846); Pennsylvania: Davis v. Shoemaker, 1 Rawle (Pa.) 135 (1829); South Carolina:
McEwen v. Joy, 7 Rich. (S. C.) 33 (1853).
Thus generally in all cases where the Consideration has been Executed and where
there is an absolute duty to pay in money the value of the performance rendered, there
Debt on Simple Contract or Indebitatus Assumpsit is a proper remedy. Debt lies in
all case where the Law Courts can properly give specific performance of a duty to pay
money, namely, where the duty is an absolute one, not subject to any conditions.
151 5 Bing. 286, 130 Eng. Rep. 1071 (1828). For earlier cases, see: English: Mayor
v. Clarke, 4 B. & Aid. 268, 106 Eng. Rep. 936 (1821); Falmouth v. Penrose, 6 B. & C.
385, 108 Eng. Rep. 494 (1827).
152 CoMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, C. IV, 155 (7th ed., Oxford 1775).
153 Illinois: Mix v. Netteton, 29 Ill. 246 (1862); Kentucky: Watson v. McNairy,
1 Bibb. (Ky.) 356 (1809).
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which, as to a sum of money, the plaintiff was entitled, proceeding
upon his jus ad rem."'5 4 We are, therefore, concerned only with that
Form of the Action of Debt which remained after Detinue split off
from the main Trunk of the Tree; that is, that Form of Debt used
to recover money debts, known as Debt in the debet et detinet, 55
which, like its ancestor, the Real Action, seeks the recovery of a
certain sum of money to which the plaintiff has a right by reason of
the defendant's legal duty to pay.
For the plaintiff to recover in Debt, therefore, he must set forth
in his Declaration a right to the thing demanded; that such right
arises from something other than a Promise or voluntary assumption;
it must, in truth, be independent of what we now understand as a
Contractual Obligation. Under the Ancient Law, matter which created
in one person a right to something in the possession of another, was
called a causa debendi, or "a ground of indebtedness, a basis of the
duty to deliver, the origin of an obligation to pay."' 58 As Pollock
and Maitland said: "It enters no one's head that a Promise is the
ground of the action. No pleader propounding such an action will
think of beginning his Declaration with 'whereas the defendant Promised to pay,' he will begin with 'whereas the plaintiff lent or (as the
case may be) sold or leased to the defendant.' In short, he will mention some causa debendi, and the cause will not be a Promise."' 5 7
(III) A Parol Promise Created No Obligation During the Developmental Stages of Debt.-Let us, by way of illustration, suppose
that A undertook to sell his horse, Damascus, to B, the defendant, in
exchange for two steers, that A delivered Damascus to B, and that B
thereupon refused to deliver the steers, but retains them in his possession. Clearly A is entitled to recover the steers. But is this so because
B has Executed a Contract Obligating himself to make delivery?
Certainly not, and, if this were the only basis of A's claim, he could
not have recovered; the Court might well have told him that he
154 The Action of Debt, Pt. H, -, 12 GEO. L. J. 28, 29-30 (1923).
155 Where one of the parties to the Action of Debt died, the Form of Declaring
was in Debt in the detinet, not in Debt in the debet et detinet. It was said that these
distinctions, which require the Declaration to be only in the detinet, where one of the
original parties died, were held to be substantive as late as 1619. Reynell v. Langcastle,
Cro. Jac. 545, 79 Eng. Rep. 467 (1631). A defect as to wording was, however, only
available on Special Demurrer, after the Statute of 4 Anne, c. 16, § 1 (1705). Childress
v. Emory, 8 Wheat. (U. S.) 642. But according to 1 Cnrrry, TR As oN PLEADING
AND PARTIES To AcTIoNs, wrn PRECEDENTS AN FoRms, c. III, 284, note b (16th Am.
ed. by Perkins, Springfield 1876), an improper use of the word "debet" was not even

subject to a Special Demurrer, being treated as mere surplusage.

150 Keigwin, The Action of Debt, Pt. II, 12 GEo. L. J. 28, 30 (1923).
157 2 HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, c. V, Contract, 210 (Cambridge 1895).

NEW YORK LAW FORUM

[VOL, 4

deserved to lose his horse because of his folly in trusting B's word.
In other words, at the time when Debt was reaching maturity, a Parol
Promise, which several Centuries later became enforceable in Special
Assumpsit, created no legal obligation; the obligation, if any, was
merely moral, and hence not justiciable. In such a case, however, A
would recover, as B has received a benefit at his expense, and one
who profits by the act of another ought, debet, to compensate that
other in a manner commensurate with the benefit conferred. Or to
put it in a technical language, B, having received A's horse, ought to
render a quid pro quo, or the steers, as a balance against the horse,
the so-called "Executed Consideration." Thus, where a Simple Contract has been exercised on one side so as to transfer a quid pro quo,
or a benefit to the other side, the benefit received creates in the receiver, by Operation of Law, a legal duty to render an equitable benefit to the plaintiff; that is, it creates an indebtedness, which may be regarded as an example of causa debendi. And these causae debendi,
vaguely understood in the early stages of development, took on definite form, and were ultimately clarified'"8 as being derived from three
sources, Simple Contracts, Specialties and Records, including Statutes.
III.

DEBT-DISTINGUISHED FROM AND CONCURRENT WITH

OTHER ACTIONS
SPECIAL AsSUMPSIT is to be distinguished from Debt, in that it

lies for the Breach of a Modern Contract, in which what is recovered
is Damages, whereas, when we say that Debt lies on a Simple Contract, we are referring to the early Common-Law Concept of what is
termed "a Simple Executed Contract," which term is descriptive not
of a Contract in the Modern Sense, but in the sense that the plaintiff
has delivered a quid pro quo to the defendant, for which the defendant has failed to pay, or has otherwise become indebted to the
plaintiff by Operation of Law. In such case there is no Contract at all
in the Modern Sense, and it is of course settled, as previously observed,
that Debt will not lie upon a Promise for a Promise, 1r9 as in such case
there is no quid pro quo passing to the defendant.
158 On the early attempts at classifying the varieties of debt, see Fn'oor, ISTORY
AND SOURCES OF = COMMON LAW, c. 10, Debt, 23 (London 1949), in which he cites
a case in which it was said that "each writ of Debt is general and in one form, but
the count is Special and makes mention of the Contract, the Obligation or the Record,
as the case requires." Anonymous, Y. B. 11 Hen. IV, f. 73, pl. 11 (1409).
159 English: Walker v. Walker, 5 Mod. 13, 87 Eng. Rep. 490 (1694); Smith v.
Airey, 6 Mod. 128, 87 Eng. Rep. 885 (1704); Hard's Case, 1 Salk. 23, pl. 3, 91 Eng.
Rep. 22 (1696); Bovey v. Castleman, 1 Ld. Raym. 69, 91 Eng. Rep. 942 (1695); New
Jersey: Furman v. Parke, 21 N. J. L. 318 (1848).

THE ACTION OF DEBT

Debt is to be distinguished from Indebitatus Assumpsit, being in
many respects much broader than the latter action. It is true that
Debt and Indebitatus Assumpsit are concurrent remedies in the Field
of Debt on Simple (Executed) Contract, but Indebitatus Assumpsit
will not lie upon a Sealed Contract, a Record, or with some exceptions, upon a Statute. In the sense that Indebitatus Assumpsit came
to be the remedy for recovery of Quasi-Contractual Obligations
through the use of the Common Counts, it may be said to be broader
than Debt. This advantage was later lessened by the fact that in
some Jurisdictions Debt also came to be recognized as a Quasi-Contractual Remedy, by a process which is not clear. And, of course,
Debt was subject to Wager of Law, whereas Indebitatus Assumpsit
was not, and it was this fact which led to the obsolescence of Debt
after Slade's Case'10 in 1603, which held the Two Actions to be concurrent remedies on a Simple (Executed) Contract.
Generally, Debt and Covenant are exclusive remedies, except
where the amount of Damages due upon the Breach of a Sealed Instrument are liquidated. In such instance, Debt and Covenant are concurrent remedies; where, however, the Damages upon Breach of a
Specialty are unliquidated, Covenant is the only remedy.' 0
Finally, under certain circumstances, Debt, Special Assumpsit and
Indebitatus Assumpsit, were concurrent remedies. To illustrate, let
us suppose that A says to B, "I will deliver ten cords of wood to you at
five dollars a cord," to which B replies, "Go ahead and deliver it and
I will pay for it." A then delivers the wood, but B refuses to pay.
Debt will lie, for a quid pro quo-a benefit-has passed from A to B
and B has failed to give A what, by Operation of Law, belongs to him.
Indebitatus Assumpsit will lie as it is a concurrent remedy with Debt
on Simple (Executed) Contract; and Special Assumpsit will also lie,
because over and above the benefit received by B-the delivery of the
wood-the defendant B has Breached his Express Promise to pay. So
we may say that while in general, neither Debt nor Indebitatus Assumpsit will lie where the ground of the obligation is an Express Contract, the opposite is true in those instances in which there is present
over and above the Simple (Executed) Contract, an Express Promise
which has been Breached.
(To Be Continued)
100 2 Co. 92b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1074 (1603).

161 Originally this concurrence did not obtain; Covenant would not lie for a Debt
where evidenced by a sealed instrument; it must arise from some transaction such as a
loan or sale or the like. 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY or ENGLIsnr LAW, c. V, 217
(Cambridge 1895).

